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Comment
Bankruptcy and Divorce: The Courts Send
a Message to Congress
"[W]hen a debtor uses the Code to steal from his former
wife, we should not likely conclude that the Code, properly read,
commands such a result."1
I. Introduction
The rights of both are as American as apple pie, but when it
comes to debtors in bankruptcy and families in divorce, whose
rights supersede when there is only one piece of pie?2
This Comment will discuss the ways in which a debtor in
bankruptcy, by claiming an exemption under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 ("Bankruptcy Code"),3 is often able to ei-
ther retain for himself, or convey to commercial creditors, prop-
erty that was awarded to his ex-spouse4 pursuant to either a
1. In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 607 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
2. "The support and maintenance of the family, even though separated through di-
vorce, should continue to be a principle consideration in the distribution of property."
Letter from Rep. Henry J. Hyde, R. Ill., to Members of Congress (June 28, 1991) (accom-
panying H.R. 1242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Property Settlement Integrity Act))
(hereinafter "Dear Colleague Letter"); see infra notes 519-24 and accompanying text.
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1988) (§§ 1501-151326 repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-554,
Title II, 100 Stat. 3088, 3103 (1986)).
4. Although in a few of the cases the debtor who attempts to retain property that
has been granted to the ex-spouse is the wife, in most cases it is the husband. While this
Comment does not suggest that it is any less unfair when the non-debtor spouse who is
deprived of his property is the husband, the problem is generally more acute when the
non-debtor spouse is the wife, because it is usually the wife, and not the husband, who is
in need of ongoing support. For ease of reference, and because this discussion principally
addresses the problem of the ex-wife who, having been awarded a property settlement
rather than alimony and/or child support, is at risk of losing her property if her former
1
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court ordered settlement agreement or a negotiated settlement
agreement in divorce. 5 The Supreme Court, in the 1991 case of
Farrey, v. Sanderfoot,6 reversed the Seventh Circuit7 and held
that a debtor could not avoid his ex-wife's lien on the marital
home.8 Sanderfoot, the husband, had been awarded the home
pursuant to a divorce separation agreement in exchange for a
commitment to reimburse his wife Farrey, over time, for the
value of her equity in the home.9 Shortly thereafter, Sanderfoot
filed for voluntary bankruptcy'0 and claimed that he was enti-
tled, under his homestead exemption in bankruptcy," to avoid
Farrey's lien on the home.'"
Although it may appear to do so at first blush, the decision
in Sanderfoot does not create a rule of law that all obligations
springing from a familial relationship cannot be avoided by fil-
husband declares bankruptcy, the parties in the cases will be referred to as "the debtor"
and "the non-debtor spouse," regardless of whether, in the actual case being discussed,
the debtor is the husband or the wife. The cases will be set forth to chronicle the direc-
tions that statutory construction of the Bankruptcy Code have taken. Additionally, when
the discussion calls for a personal pronoun, the masculine "he," "him," or "his," will be
used to denote the debtor, and the feminine "she," or "her" will be used to denote the
non-debtor spouse. This nomenclature will be used when discussing all cases except Far-
rey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991). Finally, since Mrs. Sanderfoot resumed her
maiden name of "Farrey" after the divorce, the cases generally refer to her as "Farrey"
or "Ms. Farrey;" occasionally the cases refer to the couple as "the Sanderfoots."
5. An informal survey of both lawyers who do not specialize in either bankruptcy or
divorce law, and of lay people, suggests that this phenomenon is virtually unknown. A
feature article concerning the search for somewhat sensational "sound bites" for televi-
sion programs such as "Good Morning America" and the "Today Show," reports:
Let's peek backstage at the "Today" show. It is 10:30 a.m. on a recent Tuesday,
and producers in Washington, New York and London are having a conference call
about the next day's guests .... [A Washington producer] pitches two Washing-
ton stories from her ... office .... There are no takers .... [A New York pro-
ducer] mentions a Supreme Court case involving a man who filed for bankruptcy
to avoid making divorce payments. "We might be able to get the wife who filed
the suit," she says.
Howard Kurtz, How to Succeed in Washington by Going on Television, WASH. POST,
May 19, 1991, at W14.
6. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
7. In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
8. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991) (where the ex-wife's interest pre-
exists the fixing of the lien); see also infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
9. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1827.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1827-28.
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ing for bankruptcy.13 A study of similar cases," together with a
reading of the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code," demon-
strates that, in many situations, a number of legal theories en-
able a debtor to avoid financial obligations to his ex-spouse by
filing for bankruptcy."
Many bankruptcy, district court, and circuit court judges,
have expressed the opinion that to allow a: debtor to retain prop-
erty which in effect belongs to his ex-spouse, is unjust.17 These
judges have clearly felt prompted to comment regardless of
whether they have held, based on the facts and applicable law,
that a debtor is exempted or not exempted from conveying
property to his or her ex-spouse.' s For example, Judge Posner,
in disagreeing with the majority in the Seventh Circuit decision
in In re Sanderfoot,'9 (which affirmed the district court and held
that Mr. Sanderfoot could avoid his former wife's lien on marital
property) commented:
The fact that a judicial decision offends the moral sense of lay-
men does not prove the decision was wrong. Institutional or sys-
temic considerations, themselves morally significant, but invisible
to the laity, may outweigh the tug of simple justice. But they do
not do so here .... [W]hen a debtor uses the Code to steal from
his former wife, we should not lightly conclude that the Code,
properly read, commands such a result.20
Additionally, most of the courts that have held that a
debtor is excused from a financial obligation to his non-debtor
ex-spouse have stated that it would be appropriate for Congress,
rather than the courts, to change the laws in such a way that a
just result could virtually always be achieved.2
For purposes of this discussion, it is interesting to bear in
mind four policies that were ingrained in United States society
13. See discussion infra part 1.C.
14. See discussion infra part II.C.
15. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326.
16. See discussion infra part II.C.
17. See discussion infra part II.C.
18. See discussion infra part II.C.
19. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 598 (Posner, J., dissenting); see infra notes 393-98 and
accompanying text.
20. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606-07 (emphasis added).
21. See infra part II.A.
1993]
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from its earliest days. First, married women could not own prop-
erty.22 Second, husbands had a duty to support their wives, and
this principle extended even beyond the marriage. 23 Third, di-
vorce was based on fault: if a husband was at fault he was
obliged to pay alimony; if a wife was at fault she was not eligible
for alimony.2' Finally, while the notion of debtors' prisons and
otherwise intolerant treatment of debtors was generally consid-
ered repugnant, the prospect of a bankruptcy law that would be
available to individual debtors on a voluntary basis was largely
considered to be unconstitutional.25
Although these policies have changed over the years in an
enlightened attempt to achieve fairness, it is not always clear
whose rights have fared well and whose rights have fared less
well. For example, married women can now own property, both
individually and jointly with their spouses.2 However, if they
divorce, they are often at risk of losing their share in the prop-
erty that they owned jointly with their spouses if their ex-hus-
bands declare bankruptcy. 27 This property could conceivably be
property that the woman owned individually prior to, and even
at some point during, the marriage.2 8 Today, during the course
of a marriage, "each spouse has a legal duty to support the
other."29 This mutuality is extended to support obligations when
a marriage is terminated; men are as eligible as women to receive
alimony. 0 At present, legal grounds for divorce are rarely fault
related 3 ' and, correspondingly, support and property awards in
22. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
23. Sheryl L. Scheible, Bankruptcy and the Modification of Support: Fresh Start,
Head Start, or False Start?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 577, 582 n.23 (1991) (citing HOMER H.
CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 250-51 (2d ed. 1988)).
24. See infra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
25. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 25 (1935); see infra
note 63 and accompanying text.
26. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
27. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 99-163.
28. See infra part II.C.
29. Scheible, supra note 23, at 582 n.23 (citing HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 251 (2d ed. 1988) ("[Dluty of support must
rest equally on both spouses to be constitutional.")). "Largely as a result of the women's
movement and equal protection claims based on gender discrimination, today the obliga-
tion is mutual." "Today each spouse has a legal duty to support the other." Id. at 582.
30. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
31. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 99-163.
[Vol. 13:643
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divorce are now rarely based on fault.3 2 Women generally receive
lower awards of support than they did under fault-based guide-
lines.33 Individual debtors can declare bankruptcy 34 and they
can do so voluntarily.3 5 Moreover, they can legally engage in pre-
petition planning by transferring assets into the type of property
that qualifies for an exemption from the bankruptcy estate. 6
This Comment discusses the ongoing conflict between the
right to a fresh start for a debtor through bankruptcy and the
rights of his family to the fulfillment of his financial obligation
to them. Part II addresses the development of bankruptcy laws
in the United States which led to the present Bankruptcy
Code.-8 It emphasizes the specific provisions that enable a
debtor to retain property that has been granted to his or her ex-
spouse as part of a settlement agreement, and gives a capsule
overview of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that are rele-
vant to the discussion. When pertinent to the subject of alimony
and property division as they affect ex-spouses in bankruptcy,
Part II also traces the steps and philosophies leading to today's
married women's property ownership rights and today's divorce
laws. Part II also briefly explores the conflicts that exist between
state and federal courts, and state and federal laws in cases
where marital and divorce issues are collateral to bankruptcy.
Part II continues with a discussion of the types of cases that
typically arise in the context of bankruptcy and divorce: support
awards as opposed to property awards, financial obligations to
32. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 99-163.
33. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 108-144.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1988).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 301 provides:
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a
debtor under such chapter. The commencement of a voluntary case under a chap-
ter of this title constitutes an order for relief under such chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
"Section 109 defines the entities that may be debtors in the various types of bankruptcy
proceedings." DAVID L. BUCHBINDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE,
§5.6 (1991) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(a)).
36. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
37. "Bankruptcy law has long struggled to find a balance between affording a debtor
a fresh start on the one hand, and protecting the debtor's family members on the other."
Scheible, supra note 23, at 579.
38. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326.
1993]
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third parties or agreements to hold harmless, and pensions. Part
II then tracks some of the major cases which preceded
Sanderfoot and which, like Sanderfoot, addressed the issue of
liens of non-debtor spouses against property awarded to debtor
spouses, examines the Sanderfoot decision in depth, and surveys
the cases with like issues that have been decided after
Sanderfoot. Part II then reviews some of the extraordinary and
extensive commentary contained in the cases regarding the un-
fairness of allowing debtors to either retain for themselves or
otherwise deprive non-debtor spouses of the non-debtor spouses'
property. Part II concludes by setting forth the Property Settle-
ment Integrity Act of 1990."9
Part III recapitulates a cross section of the opinions and
dissents that forcefully express the need for Congress to amend
the Bankruptcy Code with respect to property rights in divorce,
points out that Congress has enacted a number of statutes
designed to protect non-debtor spouses' interests in debtors'
pensions, and argues that this point is persuasive evidence of
Congress' motivation to ensure fair outcomes for non-debtor
spouses. Part III then reviews some of the many cases that have
strained to find theories upon which to base a fair outcome. The
courts are split on the interpretation of the bankruptcy laws in
some of these factual situations. Thus, the reasoning of the dif-
ferent courts in arriving at different holdings even though
presented with virtually identical fact patterns, is set forth. The
question of whether courts will be as free, after Sanderfoot, to
arrive at creative holdings in order to achieve fairness, or
whether only those cases whose facts fit squarely within the
Sanderfoot pattern will be entitled to the same holding, is ad-
dressed. Part III notes that at least one court has managed to
find a rationale that bars the debtor from avoiding the non-
debtor's lien on marital property, notwithstanding the holding in
Sanderfoot.4 0 Finally, Part III urges the adoption of the Prop-
erty Settlement Integrity Act of 1990."'
Part IV briefly addresses the extent to which bankruptcy
39. H.R. 1242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
40. Klemme v. Schoneman, 477 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); see infra notes
550-55 and accompanying text.
41. H.R. 1242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
[Vol. 13:643
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and divorce laws, which were adopted to further our social poli-
cies, have accomplished their goals.
II. Background
A. Policy and Legislation: Historical Development
1. A "Fresh Start": Bankruptcy Law
a. Historical Background
In 1934, the Supreme Court, in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,42
stated that the purpose of bankruptcy law:
has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of
public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property
which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of pre-existing debt.43
The United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
have the power to ... establish ... uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."" In pre-colonial
days, debtors were often incarcerated in debtors' prisons.45 The
framers of the United States Constitution expressly granted the
power to make bankruptcy laws to Congress in order to establish
a compassionate and methodical system of relief for debtors and
an equitable system of relief for creditors. 4 The framers' intent
was to avoid the experience of debtors in common law England
and western Europe. 47 Notwithstanding the Framers' vision, the
road to the present Bankruptcy Code' 8 has been anything but
smooth.4 9 No fewer than five national bankruptcy acts preceded
it,5" each of which was the subject of much heated debate.5 1 In
42. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
43. Id. at 244.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
45. GRADY L. PErTIGREW, JR., THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BANK-
RUPTCY CODE THEORY INTO PRACTICE 2 (1982).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326.
49. See generally WARREN, supra note 25.
50. The first Bankrupt Act was passed by Congress in 1800. Id. at 19. By its terms,
it was to operate only five years, but it was repealed by Congress after only three years.
19931
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1935, one author noted that "desire for bankruptcy legislation
and depression have always been coupled in our history ....
Thus, it is against that backdrop that warring interests and phi-
losophies were expressed with respect to every bankruptcy act as
far back as that of 1898.
The first issue for debate with each of these five acts, that is
to say every national bankruptcy act except the present Bank-
ruptcy Code, was whether or not to permit bankruptcy at all.5 3
For example, when the Bankrupt Act of August 19, 1841, was
passed, John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary:
I believe no bankrupt law can, in this country, be of much benefit
to the class of creditors. The bankrupt law of 1800 operated as a
receipt in full for some hundreds of men who had large debts and
nothing to pay. This bill will pass some thousands through the
same process. 5
Another issue was that of identifying which classes of peo-
ple would receive bankruptcy protection. Some wanted to limit
Id. The Bankrupt Act of Aug. 19, 1841, 5 Stat. 1440, was repealed in 1843. BUCHBINDER,
supra note 35, § 1.4. The Bankrupt Act of 1867 was repealed in 1873. WARREN, supra
note 25, at 115-16; the Bankrupt Act of 1874 was repealed in 1878. Id. at 122. The Bank-
rupt Act of 1898 (hereinafter The Act) was replaced by the present Bankruptcy Code of
1978. BUCHBINDER, supra note 35, § 1.4.
51. For example, Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to James Pleasants dated December
26, 1821, stated:
I find you are to be harassed again with a bankrupt law. Could you not compro-
mise between agriculture and commerce, by passing such a law which like the
bylaws of incorporate towns should be binding on the inhabitants of such towns
only, being the residence of commerce, leaving the agriculturalists, inhabitants of
the country, in undisturbed possession of the rights and modes of proceedings to
which their habits, their interests and their partialities attach them? This would
be as uniform as other laws of local obligation.
12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905), quoted in WARREN, supra
note 25, at 172 n.51 (emphasis in original). In addition, Justice Story commented that:
One of the most pressing grievances bearing upon commercial, manufacturing, and
agricultural interests at the present moment is the total want of a general system
of bankruptcy. It is well known that the power has lain dormant except for a short
period ever since the Constitution was adopted; and the excellent system they put
into operation [speaking of the Act of 1800] was repealed before it had any fair
trial....
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1830). quoted in WARREN, supra
note 25, at 168 n.26.
52. WARREN, supra note 25, at 21-22.
53. See generally WARREN, supra note 25.
54. Id. at 79.
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eligibility for bankruptcy to merchants only,55 while others
wanted to include other classes.56
The issue that was probably the most hotly contested was
whether bankruptcy should be voluntary, involuntary, or both.5 7
Technically, a bankruptcy proceeding under the 1800 Act "could
only be initiated by creditors and was a compulsory process."5 8
However, bankruptcy proceedings were actually "utilized by
debtors themselves through some friendly creditor."59 The
-Bankrupt Act of 1847, originally introduced in Congress in 1820,
represented the first legislation in the history of the world to be
"proposed to benefit debtors at large, instead of merely to en-
able creditors to reach the property of merchants and traders. 60
This proposal urged "that any person imprisoned for debt might
voluntarily file a petition to be adjudged a bankrupt."61 In Feb-
ruary 1827, a bill containing a section authorizing voluntary
bankruptcy was defeated.62 By the time the Act of 1867 was be-
ing debated, both lawyers and the courts "had so thoroughly ac-
cepted the principle of voluntary bankruptcy as being within the
Constitutional power of Congress, that the question was not
even raised." 3 However, among the points of disagreement in
the debates leading up to the passage of the Bankrupt Law of
55. Id. at 7. For example, in 1788 the New York Constitutional Convention "urged
an amendment to the Federal Constitution so as to provide 'that the power of Congress
to pass uniform laws concerning bankruptcy shall only extend to merchants and other
traders ...... Id. at 7-8.
56. Id. at 8.
Whether the framers of the Constitution used the word "bankruptcies" as a com-
pulsory form of procedure confined to traders as in the English bankruptcy legis-
lation existing in 1878, or whether they contemplated that it might apply to all
classes of persons and all forms of insolvency as in some of the American states of
that day, are matters which for eighty years there was much discussion.
Id. at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 20.
59. Id. (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 27.
61. Id. Thomas H. Benton, among others, "opposed the voluntary bill as unconstitu-
tional" and termed it "a mere insolvent law at the will of the debtor." Id. at 62 (quoting
Thomas H. Benton). Henry Hubbard of New Hampshire said the voluntary feature was
"admirably calculated in favor of dishonest debtors and rogues." Id. (quoting Henry
Hubbard).
62. Id. at 45. At that time the preponderance of legal opinion held that a provision
which allowed voluntary bankruptcy in any federal law was unconstitutional. Id.
63. See generally WARREN, supra note 25, at 87.
19931
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1898, the issue of voluntariness was once again in the forefront.6 4
In spite of the constitutional grant of power to Congress to
"establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States,"6 there were many who opposed
the concept of uniform bankruptcy laws. Opponents of the bill
(circa 1820) argued that it was undesirable "that any bankruptcy
law should be uniform throughout the country.""6 For example,
James Pendall of Virginia argued that state legislatures were
more familiar than the federal government with the desires of
their own constituents. 7 Thus, another issue was whether the
federal government or the states would define a debtor's
exemptions.
64. Id. at 135. According to Warren, some congressmen:
favored a purely voluntary bill for relief of debtors. William A. Stone of Pennsyl-
vania said that "involuntary bankruptcy only brought about forced sales, and de-
preciated market values, injuring the whole country." . . . Such a bill should
never be enacted when a business depression exists. The only argument for it is to
afford greater facility to creditors in the collection of debts .... [M]y judgment is
that the States are right. Indulgence to the debtor gives time and a breathing spell
until more prosperous times arrive.. . . Constantine B. Kilgore of Texas said that
the bill was "vile and bad, subserving the interests of only a limited class of selfish
people - the great wholesale merchants." [Charles A.] Culbertson of Texas said
that farmers' debts to retail merchants would be "dragged into the Bankruptcy
Courts and their mortgages foreclosed with merciless promptness."
Id.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
66. WARREN, supra note 25, at 36.
The violent opposition by John Randolph and most of the Virginia representa-
tives was largely due to the fact that a National bankruptcy law would enable
creditors to reach all real estate of their debtor, whereas under the Virginia State
law real estate in fee could not be taken by a creditor on execution.
Id. at 32 (endnote omitted). "The debtor class itself found that while the statute (the
1841 Act) had preserved all State liens, it had not preserved the various State exemp-
tions of property from execution and other protective provisions furnished by the States
to debtors." Id. at 82 (endnote omitted). In 1863, when bills that had been introduced in
the Senate and the House were being debated, James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin:
moved that all debtors' property so exempted by the States should be free from
the demands of creditors under the National bankruptcy law. To this, objection
was strongly made that, as these exemptions were very different in the several
States, their allowance would render the law non-uniform and that Congress had
no power so to discriminate in favor of more property in one State than in an-
other, and thus to benefit debtors in one State more than in another.
Id. at 100.
67. Id. (quoting James Pindall of Virginia).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/12
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b. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Overview
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code),
which replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Bankruptcy Act),
provides two types of relief to debtors. One form of relief is by
means of liquidation of the debtor's estate (Chapter 7), and the
other is by means of reorganization of the debtor's financial obli-
gations (Chapters 11 and 13).
Once a debtor declares bankruptcy, all of his assets are
brought into what is called an estate.6 8 The estate is then di-
vided, as provided in the Code, to equitably satisfy the debtor's
creditors.6 However, before this division is made, the debtor is
entitled to exempt - in other words to remove from the estate
and keep - certain property interests.7 0 This is one of the ways
68. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
69. Section 541 was explained as follows:
This section defines property of the estate, and specifies what property becomes
property of the estate. The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate.
Under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), the estate is comprised of all legal or equi-
table interest of the debtor in property, wherever located, as of the commence-
ment of the case . . . Paragraph (1) . . . includes as property of the estate all
property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start. After the property
comes into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to exempt it under proposed
11 U.S.C. 522, and the court will have jurisdiction to determine what property
may be exempted and what remains as property of the estate.
S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (hereinafter S. REP. No. 598), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5868, 5868.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 522 provides:
(b)... [Ain individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate
(d)(1)The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in real
property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as
a residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.
(2)The debtor's interest, not to exceed $1,200 in value, in one motor vehicle.
(3)The debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any particular item or
$4,000 in aggregate value, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing ap-
parel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are held pri-
marily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.
(4)The debtor's aggregate interest in any property, not to exceed $500 in
value, in jewelry held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(5)The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $400 plus up to
$3,750 of any unused amount of the exemption provided under paragraph (1) of
11
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that the Bankruptcy Code provides the debtor with a fresh
this subsection.
(6)The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in any imple-
ments, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a
dependent of the debtor.
(7)Any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor, other than a
credit life insurance contract.
(8)The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $4,000 less any
amount of property of the estate transferred in the manner specified in section
542(d) of this title, in any accrued dividend or interest under, or loan value of, any
unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor under which the insured is
the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent.
(9)Professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(A) a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public
assistance benefit;
(B) a veterans' benefit;
(C) a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit;
(D) alimony, support or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably nec-
essary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension,
profit sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disa-
bility, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, unless-
(i) such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an in-
sider that employed the debtor at the time the debtor's rights under such plan or
contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a),
403(b), 408, or 409 [footnote omitted] of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26
U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409).
(11) The debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to-
(A) an award under a crime victim's reparation law;
(B) a payment on account of the wrongful death of an individual of whom the
debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent of the debtor;
(C) a payment under a life insurance contract that insured the life on an indi-
vidual of whom the debtor was a dependent on the date of such individual's death,
to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any depen-
dent of the debtor;
(D) a payment, not to exceed $7,500, on account of personal bodily injury, not
including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the
debtor or an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent; or
(E) a payment in compensation of loss of future earnings of the debtor or an
individual of whom the debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
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start.71 Unsecured creditors cannot reach this exempted prop-
erty by pre-petition attachment. 2 The exemption is intended to
thwart creditors who, sensing an impending bankruptcy, rush to
secure a debt, thereby preventing the debtor from obtaining a
fresh start. Pre-petition planning that enables a debtor to con-
vert property into the type of property that will be exempt once
it becomes part of his bankruptcy estate is generally allowed.7 3
However, "otherwise exempt property" is subject to "properly
secured liens or properly filed tax liens. '74
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 had provided that the law of
the debtor's domicile would determine what property could be
exempted in bankruptcy.7 This resulted in a lack of uniform-
ity7" and the "Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States proposed a uniform federal bankruptcy exemption
71. The legislative history in this regard is repeated continuously in the cases. "Sub-
section (e) protects, the debtor's exemptions, his discharge, and thus his fresh start by
permitting him to avoid certain liens on exempt property. The debtor may avoid a judi-
cial lien on any property to the extent that the lien could have been exempted in the
absence of the lien . . . " S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 86. "11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f)(1) allows the debtor to undo the actions of creditors that bring legal actions
against the debtor shortly before bankruptcy. If a creditor beats the debtor into court,
the debtor is nevertheless entitled to his exemptions." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 126 (1977) (hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 595).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 522 exemptions provide in pertinent part:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fix-
ing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien
impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsec-
tion (b) of this section, if such lien is-
(1) a judicial lien ...
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
73. S. REP. No. 598 explains the exemptions:
Subsection (b) tracks current law. It permits a debtor the exemption to which he
is entitled under other Federal law and the law of the State of his domicile.
As under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert non-exempt prop-
erty into exempt property before filing a bankruptcy petition. The practice is not
fraudulent as to creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the exemp-
tions to which he is entitled under the law.
S. REP. No. 598, supra note 69, at 75-76, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5861, 5862
§ 522 (emphasis added); see also Alan N. Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent
Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on
the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615 (1978).
74. BUCHBINDER, supra note 35, § 9.4.
75. GEORGE M. TREISTER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW § 7.02 (1986).
76. Id.
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system, ' 77 when making recommendations with respect to what
was to become the current Bankruptcy Code. 78 However, politi-
cal exigencies allowed only for compromise. 79 Thus, the Bank-
ruptcy Code allows a debtor to choose between a federal list of
exemptions or his state's list of exemptions, unless the state
elects to opt out of the federal list.8 0 In 1983, one commentator
reported that almost three-fourths of the states had "enacted
opt-out legislation, so that the federal exemption alternative
[was] . . .available in .. .relatively few states."8
A discharge operates to legally relieve the debtor of all dis-
chargeable obligations.8 2 In general, a discharge "voids any judg-
ment" and permanently enjoins the collection of any debt sub-
ject to discharge.8 3 Debts that are incurred before the date of the
bankruptcy petition are dischargeable with some exceptions.8
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5206(a) (McKinney Supp. 1993), which
provides in relevant part:
Property of one of the following types, not exceeding ten thousand dollars in value
above liens and encumbrances, owned and occupied as a principal residence, is
EXEMPT from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment, unless the
judgment was recovered wholly for the purchase price thereof:
1. a lot of land with a dwelling thereon,
2. shares of stock in a cooperative apartment corporation,
3. units of a condominium apartment, or
4. a mobile home.
Id.; see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.20(1) (West Supp. 1992), which provides in relevant
part:
An exempt homestead as defined in s. 990.01(14) selected by a resident owner and
occupied by him or her shall be exempt from execution, from the lien of every
judgment and from liability for the debts of the owner to the amount of $40,000,
except mortgages, laborers', mechanics' and purchase money liens and taxes and
except as otherwise provided. The exemption shall not be impaired by temporary
removal with the intention to reoccupy the premises as a homestead nor by the
sale of the homestead, but shall extend to the proceeds derived from the sale to an
amount not exceeding $40,000, while held, with the intention to procure another
homestead with the proceeds, for 2 years.
Id.
81. TREISTER, supra note 75, § 7.02, at 283.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988) provides in relevant part: "Except as provided in sec-
tion 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection (a) of this section discharges the
debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under this chapter
. ... " See infra part II.B.
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Additionally, "[e]xemptions do not protect a debtor's otherwise
exempt property from non-dischargeable taxes or non-discharge-
able maintenance, alimony, or support. s5
From these beginnings, law has evolved whereby a debtor
can keep his or her ex-spouse's property under the guise of a
"fresh start" in bankruptcy. The development of laws which give
married women the right to own property, recapitulated in the
next section, is another of the factors that have often contrib-
uted to depriving ex-wives of the property interests awarded to
them through a divorce decree when their ex-husbands declare
bankruptcy.86
2. Married Women's Property Ownership Rights
The development of family property law in the United
States has been "characterized by the decline of the autocratic
power of the husband-father. 8 7 The changes have been subtle
and there has been little attendant public controversy."'
Until the mid 1800's, married women were not permitted to
control property that they had acquired before marriage, that
was given to them at marriage, or that they had acquired during
marriage.8 9 This was true even if they had earned the property."
The law, which had medieval origins - the "religious concept
of the merger of the wife into the legal person of her husband," 91
and the feudal function of ensuring "that all property was held
by a male who could provide military service to his
85. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
86. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 87-98.
87. HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION 106 (1988).
88. Id.
89. Id; see also CALEB FooTE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 753 (2d
ed. 1976). An unmarried adult woman, on the other hand, "was a fully competent person
who could sue, be sued, and hold property." Id. at 751.
90. JACOB, supra note 87, at 106.
91. Id. at 107. In 1870, Sir William Blackstone wrote:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: []that is, the being of
the legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage or at least
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protec-
tion and cover, she performs every thing [sic), and is therefore called in our law-
[f]rench a feme-covert; . . . and her condition during her marriage is called her
coverture.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 441 (1870) (emphasis
in original).
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lord '92 - had been transported "to the United States from
England together with most other common law."'"
Beginning in the mid-1800's, most American jurisdictions
had enacted legislation that had "drastically transformed the le-
gal status of married women."94 These statutes, known as Mar-
ried Women's Property Acts ("MWPAs") were largely concerned
with correcting specific disabilities of married women at com-
mon law."' 95 Typically under the MWPAs, property which the
wife brought into the marriage, and property which she acquired
during the marriage, "[was] regarded as her separate estate sub-
ject to her separate control and power of disposition."" For pur-
poses of this discussion, one of the important consequences of
the MWPAs was that, whereas in the years preceding their en-
actment women who divorced were only granted support
awards, 97 now they were entitled to retain their individual prop-
erty, as well as in some cases, a share of the marital property.8
3. Divorce Law: The Shift From Awards of Support to Prop-
erty Settlements
Traditionally in the United States, grounds for divorce and
standards for the disposition of a divorcing couple's property
were based on fault,99 and wives were generally awarded perma-
nent alimony,100 now usually termed "maintenance or spousal
support,"10' although "many statutes held that when alimony
was insufficient to support the innocent wife, some of the prop-
erty of the husband could be transferred to the wife."'0 2 In the
1970's, states started to enact no-fault divorce laws and, with
these laws, came "a dramatic shift in property awards."' 0 3 Prop-
erty division began to replace "alimony as a device for adjusting
92. JACOB, supra note 87, at 107.
93. Id.
94. FooTE, supra note 89, at 754.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 756.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
101. JACOB, supra note 87, at 3.
102. Id. at 112.
103. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 30 (1985).
[Vol. 13:643
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the financial relationships of the spouses .... "104 Today, ali-
mony is gender-neutral l"' and is generally awarded only in situa-
tions where the court deems that property division is inadequate
to meet the financial needs of the spouse who requires ongoing
support. 106 Moreover, even in cases where alimony is awarded, it
is usually a temporary and transitional payment rather than a
permanent one.10 7
a. From Fault to No-Fault
The English common law provided the roots for our divorce
laws. 08 This common law, as it pertained to divorce, was pre-
mised on the concept of marriage as "a permanent and cher-
ished union which the Church - and then the state - had to
protect and preserve."'1 9 This concept lasted into the twentieth
century.110 Restricting access to divorce was assumed to be the
best way to "protect the bond of matrimony.""' Since the law's
goal was to "preserve marriage as a lifetime union," ''  divorce
was only permitted when one of the parties had a "legal basis or
ground for the divorce""' 3 springing from "a serious marital of-
fense such as adultery, cruelty, or desertion."" 4
By the beginning of the 1900's "most states had adopted...
four major elements of traditional divorce laws: fault-based
grounds, one party's guilt, the continuation of gender-based
marital responsibilities after divorce, and the linkage of financial
104. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 15.1 (2d ed. 1987). Lenore Weitzman, in her ten-year study of the effects of the no-
fault law in California, suggests that in an increasing number of cases "the property
award [is] explicitly linked to spousal support, indicating that the wife or husband re-
ceived more of one in exchange for less of the other." WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 75-
76.
105. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1978) (holding that to impose alimony
obligations on husbands and not on wives constitutes gender-based discrimination, viola-
tive of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution).
106. WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 52-109.
107. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
108. WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 6.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 7.
113. Id. (emphasis in original).
114. Id.
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awards to findings of fault. ' 115 In this way divorce law helped to
perpetuate "the spouses' conventional roles and responsibilities
in marriage - by both punishment and reward." 1 6 "[T]he sex-
based division of roles and responsibilities enshrined in tradi-
tional legal marriage [consisted of] the wife's domestic responsi-
bilities and the husband's obligation to provide support."' 17 Up
to 1970, fault-based grounds for divorce were required by every
state. 18 Alimony, and sometimes property and child custody as
well, were denied to a wife found guilty of adultery, desertion, or
cruelty; husbands who were at fault were punished through
awards of alimony, property, and child support to their ex-
wives. 9 Although the MWPAs 2 0 "were not part of the law of
divorce,"'' their adoption influenced divorce law.'22 The dispo-
sition of property in the event of a divorce was effectuated by
"[t]wo somewhat different devices . .. : alimony and property
division."' 23 The laws of some states provided for both.124 In
other states, "only alimony existed although it served the pur-
pose of property division as well."' 25 Since financial awards were
directly related to the degree of fault, "the law created strong
financial incentives for parties to exaggerate the transgressions
of their spouses. ' '1
26
115. Id.
116. Id. at 14.
117. Id. at 11; see also Audubon v. Schufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901) ("Alimony
does not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of marriage. It is not
founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the hus-
band to support the wife.").
118. WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 14.
119. Id. at 14. See also JACOB, supra note 87, at 113 ("In both common-law title
states and in community property states, fault was an important element in the disposi-
tion of property at divorce. The spouse at fault was often penalized.").
120. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
121. JACOB, supra note 87, at 111.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 112.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 12. It is not within the scope of this Comment to
trace the disposition of cases in which property awards were dictated by the fault of a
spouse, and then bankruptcy was subsequently declared under the pre-1978 Bankruptcy
Act, and in which § 17(a)(7) was successfully invoked by the "guilty" debtor, resulting in
his discharge from the property debt. However, it is a virtual certainty that a number of
those property awards, some of them based on actual fault, were discharged because they
were not in the nature of alimony pursuant to § 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act.
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Complaints with respect to fault-based divorce "had three
common themes ... doctoring of evidence to fit the narrow pro-
visions of existing divorce law [,] . . .forc[ing] family disputes
into the adversarial mode of court actions[,] . . . and [the fact
that] the nation's divorce laws were a patchwork of provisions
that differed for each state.1127 Law professors, lawyers, and
judges were the first to espouse no-fault reform. 12 8 They focused
primarily "on the legal grounds for divorce; their primary pur-
poses were to reduce expense, acrimony, and fraud in resolving
matters envisioned as essentially private concerns."' 29 In 1969,
California enacted the first legislation'" "in the Western world
to abolish completely any requirement of fault as the basis for
marital dissolution.'" 131 The new law eliminated fault "not only
from the grounds for divorce but also from the standards for di-
viding property and awarding alimony. '132
In 1974, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws ("NCCUSL") 3 3 and the American Bar Associa-
tion ("ABA") promulgated the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act ("UMDA").1 3 Like the California Family Law Act, 135 the
UMDA contains express language that eliminates fault from
consideration in awarding alimony.3 ' Although very few states
adopted the property provisions of the UMDA in toto,137 by
1974 many states had eliminated fault as both grounds for di-
127. JACOB, supra note 87, at 67-68.
128. Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning
the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSS-
ROADS 191, 195 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990).
129. Id.
130. California Family Law Act ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3314-51 (codified as
amended at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1983 and Supp. 1989)).
131. WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 15.
132. Id. at 19.
133. JACOB, supra note 87, at 62. The NCCUSL was formed in 1892 to develop,
"among other reforms, a uniform marriage and divorce act for the states." Id. at 62-63.
134. Id. at 80. The NCCUSL's early attempts to develop such an act were unsuc-
cessful. In 1974, the NCCUSL again addressed its attention to the formulation of a uni-
form marriage and divorce act for the United States which culminated in the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act.
135. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
136. UMDA § 308(b) provides, in pertinent part, "The maintenance order shall be.
without regard to marital misconduct ..... UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
§ 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 348 (1987).
137. JACOB, supra note 87, at 121.
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vorce and as a basis for property division.138 By 1985, all the
states had either eliminated fault as a ground for divorce or had
added alternative no-fault grounds. 139 Correspondingly, "a
'guilty' spouse was not necessarily punished and an 'innocent'
spouse was not necessarily rewarded in the distribution of the
family's property or in the award of alimony."1 10
Whereas under fault law "the spousal obligations of the
traditional marriage contract were reinforced upon divorce, '"4
these obligations were eliminated by no-fault law.142 Now that
most states no longer have fault based divorce, a wife of many
years, who is divorced for whatever reason (even if her husband
decides unilaterally to divorce her), 43 is generally awarded lower
maintenance and support than she would have been under fault-
based divorce guidelines.1
44
b. Economic Partnership
In the 1960s, when legal reformers began to contemplate no-
fault divorce, they also encountered great confusion with respect
to the division of a divorcing couple's property stemming from a
"multitude of provisions existed in state law[s] about how the
assets of a divorcing couple should be handled. 1' 4 5 Traditionally,
all states other than community property 46 states adhered to
138. Id. at 125. Private as well as public groups are instrumental in making policy.
Id. at 62. There are two such groups in the United States. Id. "One is the American Law
Institute [ALI] which periodically issues 'Restatements of the Law... '... that become
influential accounts of black letter law in the United States.... The second is the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), which issues
uniform state laws to guide state legislatures." Id. An example of the influence of these
groups is the Uniform Commercial Code, which the ALI and the NCCUSL drafted to-
gether. Id.
139. Id. at 80.
140. Id.
141. WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 25.
142. Id.
143. In many states, "[e]ither party can end a marriage simply by asserting that the
marriage has broken down." Lawrence M. Friedman, Divorce Law in Historical Perspec-
tive, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 664 (1984).
144. WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 32-33.
145. JACOB, supra note 87, at 116-17.
146. The community property system was "brought to the western and southwest-
ern regions of what is now the United States by the Spanish Colonists." FOOTE, supra
note 89, at 756. This system, bienes ganaciales, derived from the Spanish Codes, id.
(footnote omitted), and provided that "property acquired ... during the marriage by
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the rule that, when a marriage ended, "[t]he person who held
title to the property owned it, although an innocent wife might
be granted her dower's portion."'
147
In 1963, the President's Commission on the Status of
Women made the following recommendation:
Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes a different
but equally important contribution.... Accordingly... [we] con-
clude [ ] that during marriage each spouse should have a legally
defined and substantial right in the earnings of the other spouse
and in the real and personal property acquired as a result of such
earnings, as well as in the management of such earnings and
property. Such right should survive the marriage and be legally
recognized in the event of its termination by annulment, divorce,
or death.'4 s
Robert Levy, in the 1968 monograph that he prepared for
the NCCUSL to help them address the "widespread dissatisfac-
tion with divorce procedures,' 9 made a number of recommen-
dations, among which was that "a new category of property
which would encompass the couple's joint holdings be estab-
lished for common-law states.""'5 When referring to this new
category, Levy used the term "marital property."'' 5' The NC-
CUSL first suggested the concept of marital property in 1970
and it has clearly gathered momentum since then.' 5 Today,
most states consider that marital property includes everything
acquired during the marriage except gifts and inheritances'53
labor or for other valuable consideration, was owned jointly by the husband and wife.
Property owned by either spouse before the marriage, or acquired during the marriage
by gift or bequest, remained separate property of that spouse." Id. Should a marriage be
terminated, the community was considered dissolved and "each spouse was entitled to
his or her separate property plus his or her one-half share in the community property."
Id.
147. JACOB, supra note 87, at 2.
148. FOOTE, supra note 89, at 749 (citation omitted).
149. JACOB, supra note 87, at 67 (footnote omitted).
150. Id. at 118.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 12. This evaluation is also based on a reading of the relevant statutes for
each of the fifty states. For an overview of the relevant statutes for each of the fifty
states, see generally Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty
States: An Overview, 24 FAM. L.Q. 309 (1991).
153. Herma H. Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in Di-
VORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 128, at 6, 12.
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and which belongs to both the Wife and the husband regardless
of who holds title.' Moreover, monetary contribution toward
the acquisition of marital property is no longer a factor in its
disposition. 151 Indeed, many state statutes "explicitly mandate
that a homemaker's non-monetary contributions be counted the
same as the wage earner's salary or income."' 1
c. The Feminist Movement
Although the feminist movement did not concentrate its en-
ergies into reforming family law, its rhetoric greatly impacted
"the ways in which many Americans conceptualized the ideal
family structure. ' 157 At the onset of the feminist movement,
"some feminists thought alimony was a sexist concept that had
no place in a society in which men and women were to be
treated as equals.' ' 158 Feminists believed that women should con-
sider themselves "responsible for their own economic well-be-
ing, ' " e and were vehemently opposed to the concept of ex-wives
being treated, by the laws, "as incompetents who could not care
for themselves."'8 0 Accordingly, "[m]ost feminists in the 1960's
and 1970's did not perceive any problem with transforming ali-
mony . . . into a temporary and transitional maintenance pay-
ment, designed to allow a woman to take up the responsibility of
caring for herself independently.''6
Property division as a substitute for alimony was intended
to give women a sense of control and independence by freeing
them from the stress of waiting for regular checks which may or
may not arrive,1e2 and by giving them the opportunity to have
working capital that they can invest in order to provide for their
own support. 6 3
154. JACOB, supra note 87, at 2.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 23.
158. WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 359.
159. JACOB, supra note 87, at 23.
160. Id. at 23-24.
161. Id. at 24.
162. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 2.
163. Telephone Interview with Owen Doss, Esq., former President of American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (Oct. 18, 1991). This innovation has not worked in
most cases. In reality, the property owned by most couples consists, at best, of a house
[Vol. 13:643
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B. Bankruptcy and Divorce: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law
It is well settled that domestic relations, as creatures of
state law, are "virtually [the] exclusive province of the states," '64
and that the related establishment and modification of support
obligations have "traditionally been regarded as an exclusive
function of the state courts." ' 5 Under the judicially created "do-
mestic relations exception" adhered to by federal courts"1 6 even
in diversity cases, jurisdiction for divorce judgments, disposition
of marital property, and awards of support, rests exclusively
with the state courts, each administering its respective state
laws.' 7 Exclusive jurisdiction for bankruptcy cases rests with
the federal courts.68" However, in the course of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, as with virtually every case in which there is federal
jurisdiction, federal courts are empowered, and indeed must de-
cide certain state law issues.'69 Moreover, in particular areas,
federal bankruptcy law preempts the state rule of decision and a
federal court will decide these "state law" issues de novo as a
matter of federal law.17° Thus, when a debtor seeks to be dis-
and an automobile. These assets do not provide a woman with the liquid capital needed
to invest in order to provide for her support. Id. Considering that "less than half of
divorcing couples have significant assets to divide, and since conventional approaches to
property division generally penalize [women], this represents a rather skewed concept of
fairness." Rhode & Minow, supra note 128, at 202.
164. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
165. Scheible, supra note 23, at 581.
166. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858). The Court stated, in dic-
tum, "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon
the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in
chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one of bed and board." Id. This
became the "domestic relations exception" to subject matter jurisdiction in federal diver-
sity cases under which, even though there is diversity of citizenship and the requisite
jurisdictional amount is in controversy, federal courts refuse to hear divorce cases. See,
e.g., Anastasi v. Anastasi, 544 F. Supp. 866 (D.N.J. 1982).
167. Scheible, supra note 23, at 581 ("Both the creation and modification of support
obligations . . .traditionally have been regarded as exclusively a function of the state
courts.").
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) provides: "(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, the district court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases
under title 11." Id.
169. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 761 (1824).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(2) provides, in pertinent part: "Except as provided in subsec-
tion (b) of this section, the distinct court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of
all cases under title 11." S. REP. No. 989 and H.R. REP. No. 595 interpreted 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(5) as follows: "What constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support will be deter-
19931
23
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:643
charged from a debt to a non-debtor spouse, the characterization
of the debt, originally fashioned by a state court applying state
law, rests with a federal court applying federal law. Even though
a federal bankruptcy court will generally give some deference to
a state court's characterization of a given award as being either
in the nature of support or in the nature of a property settle-
ment,"' the federal bankruptcy court is not required to do sO.'1 2
Alimony, maintenance, support, and child support, are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.1 73 This concept was recognized by
mined under the bankruptcy law.... not state law .... " S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865. For an in-depth discussion of
federal courts interpreting state courts' judgments, see generally Scheible, supra note 23.
Professor Scheible argues that "[a] preferable procedure would be for the bankruptcy
courts to defer to the state courts whenever uncertainty about the nature of a marital
debt arises." Id. at 635. Professor Scheible points out that 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) pro-
vides for permissive abstention: "'Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the
interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law,
from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11.'" Id. at 631
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1988)).
171. In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985).
172. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1979) (stating that the bankruptcy court
is not bound by a state court's prior determination). "The bankruptcy court is not con-
fined to a review of the judgement and record in the prior state-court proceedings when
considering the dischargeability of respondent's debt." Id.; see also In re Williams, 703
F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that federal bankruptcy courts are to make the
determination of whether payments pursuant to a divorce decree are in the nature of
support, maintenance, or alimony as opposed to property because it is a federal ques-
tion.); In re Ramey, 59 B.R. 527, 529 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986); In re Tosti, 62 B.R. 131,
131 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (citing In re Bedingfield, 42 B.R. 641 (S.D. Ga. 1983) ("The law
unquestionably places the burden of the determination on the bankruptcy court.")); see
also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 71, at 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6320; S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2nd Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865.
173. 11 U.S.C. § 523 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony, to mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made
in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property
settlement agreement, but not to the extent that-
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law,
or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the So-
cial Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Gov-
ernment or to a State or any political subdivision of such State); or (B) such debt
includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such
liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support;
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/12
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courts even before the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.174 The original
policy for alimony not being dischargeable is that it "is not
founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and
legal duty of the husband to support the wife.' 1 75 The District
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New
York, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, held "that a claim for
alimony . . . was not a provable debt nor barred by a dis-
charge."' 76 The Court, in Audubon v. Schufeldt, stated that the
In re Lachemeyer decision was believed to be the only one on
that issue under the 1867 Act. 177 The court also noted that
"[1]ike decisions [had] been made .. . in the same court under
the present bankrupt act.' 78 At that time, "the present bank-
rupt act" had been in existence for only two years. However,
property settlements are treated differently from alimony: any
asset owed to an ex-spouse pursuant to a property agreement is
dischargeable.179
In cases of bankruptcy and divorce, there are four basic fact
patterns in which the debtor may raise (often successfully) the
issue of whether he will be able to avoid the terms of a settle-
ment agreement. In each of these cases, the debtor's contention
is that the underlying financial obligation is dischargeable be-
cause it is in the nature of a property settlement and not in the
11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988) (footnote omitted).
174. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
175. Audubon v. Schufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1900) (reversing an order granting a
discharge for arrears of alimony).
176. Id. The court also stated: "Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, it was held by
the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York ... that a
claim for alimony, whether accrued before or after the commencement of... bankruptcy
[proceedings], was not a provable debt nor barred by discharge." Id. at 578.
177. 18 Natl. Bankr. Reg. 270 (1878).
178. Id.
179. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988). The Code does not explicitly state that an indi-
vidual debtor is discharged from a debt to a spouse, former spouse, or child, that arises
from a property settlement. However, property settlements are not included in the debts
to a spouse, former spouse, or child, for which a debtor is not discharged. See supra note
173 (setting forth text of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)); see, e.g., In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033
(6th Cir. 1986); In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983), superseded by In re Lewis,
39 B.R. 842 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Arosema, 63 B.R. 55 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986);
Tosti v. Tosti, 62 B.R. 131 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); In re Smith, 61 B.R. 742 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1986); In re Ramey, 59 B.R. 527 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986); In re Kagan, 42 B.R. 563
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (regarding
dischargeability).
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nature of support. They are: 1) cases where a debtor claims that
a debt owed directly to an ex-spouse is in the nature of a prop-
erty settlement and not in the nature of support;180 2) cases
where there is a property settlement agreement pursuant to
which the debtor agrees to make payments to third parties or to
hold the non-debtor harmless with respect to financial obliga-
tions to third parties;181 3) cases where there is a settlement
agreement that provides for the payment of a given percentage
or amount of the debtor's pension to the non-debtor;'8 2 and 4)
cases where the non-debtor has been granted a lien on property
that was awarded to the debtor to secure the debtor's promise to
pay the non-debtor the amount of money that represents the
non-debtor's equity in the property.'
C. The "Nature" of Awards in Divorce
1. Property Settlement vs. Alimony
When a woman receives an award pursuant to a divorce de-
cree that is in the nature of a property settlement rather than in
the nature of support, and her former husband subsequently de-
clares bankruptcy, she must file suit just like any other creditor,
even if the property was meant to provide her with support. As
plaintiff, she has the burden of proof of establishing that the
award is in the nature of alimony and not in the nature of a
property settlement. 84 A woman in this situation is often with-
180. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1988); see, e.g., In re Ramey, 59 B.R. 527 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1986); In re Coffman, 52 B.R. 667 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985); see also infra part
II.C.
181. See, e.g., In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759 (3rd Cir. 1990); Sylvester v. Sylvester,
865 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986); see infra part
II.C.
182. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981); Bush v. Taylor, 893 F.2d
962, rev'd, 912 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987), reh'g denied, 493 U.S. 987 (1989); see infra part II.C.
183. See, e.g., In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); Boyd v. Robinson, 741
F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984); see infra part II.C.
184. "At the trial on a complaint objecting to a discharge, the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving the objection." Bankr. R. 4005; see also In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103,
1111 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[P]lacing the burden of persuasion on the debtor [is] legal [error] .
. o"1):
[Ilt should be made clear that the burden of proof is on the party asserting that a
debt is non-dischargeable. This is as it should be, since every debt which a debtor
must continue to bear impedes his ability to make good on the fresh start which
[Vol. 13:643
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out the means to press suit.185
Whether payments pursuant to a divorce decree are in the
nature of a property settlement as opposed to support, mainte-
nance, alimony, or child support is a federal question to be de-
termined by the federal bankruptcy court."8 6 Courts use differ-
ent tests to ascertain if money owed to an ex-spouse by a debtor
in bankruptcy is in reality part of a property settlement or is
part of a support award. The most common test is intent;187
some courts rely on the words of the agreement, regardless of
how obvious it is or is not that the "property" to be conveyed is
actually intended to provide support.188 Some courts, however,
disregard the labels given to awards in divorce decrees and look
to a variety of factors in determining whether the award in ques-
tion is, in fact, in the nature of a property settlement or in the
nature of support. 8 9
the Bankruptcy Code provides him.
In re Barac, 62 B.R. 713, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985) (citing In re Lineberry, 9 B.R. 700
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)).
185. Telephone Interview with Owen Doss, Esq., supra note 13.
186. See supra note 168-72 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
188. Scheible, supra note 23, at 594 n.92.
The bankruptcy courts now concur that they should apply some version of the
'intent' test to determine the nature of a marital debt. Although the precise for-
mulation of the intent test is not yet uniform, essentially that analysis requires
the bankruptcy court to discern whether the debt was intended by the divorce
court or the parties themselves to constitute support.
Id. (citations omitted).
189. For example, the court in In re Ramey, 59 B.R. 527, 531 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1986), reasoned as follows:
In this case the property settlement agreement does label these obligations as ali-
mony, but other factors militate against this characterization. There are other pro-
visions in the agreement which designate support and alimony .... There was
only a slight disparity in the parties [sic] income .... There was no evidence that
the parties intended the obligation to terminate upon the death or remarriage of
[one or the other] .... Nothing in the facts or in the decree suggests that the
debtor's obligation in this regard was intended to be in the nature of support.
Id.
In In re Coffman, 52 B.R. 667, 674-675 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985), Judge Mannes, after
having reviewed over thirty decisions, compiled a list of eighteen factors that could be of
help to courts in their determinations as to the parties' and/or the courts' actual intent
with respect to the divorce settlement at the time it was made. This list, which has been
widely referenced by federal courts, reads as follows:
1. Whether there was an alimony award entered by the state court.
2. Whether there was a need for support at the time of the decree; whether the
1993]
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Another of the tests that has been used to determine the
support award would have been inadequate absent the obligation in question.
3. The intention of the court to provide support.
4. Whether debtor's obligation terminates upon death or remarriage of the spouse
or a certain age of the children or any other contingency such as a change in
circumstances.
5. The age, health, work skills, and educational levels of the parties.
6. Whether the payments are made periodically over an extended period or in a
lump sum.
7. The existence of a legal or moral "obligation" to pay alimony or support.
8. The express terms of the debt characterization under state law.
9. Whether the obligation is enforceable by contempt.
10. The duration of the marriage.
11. The financial resources of each spouse, including income from employment or
elsewhere.
12. Whether the payment was fashioned in order to balance disparate incomes of
the parties.
13. Whether the creditor spouse relinquished rights of support in payment of the
obligation in question.
14. Whether there were minor children in the care of the creditor spouse.
15. The standard of living of the parties during their marriage.
16. The circumstances contributing to the estrangement of the parties.
17. Whether the debt is for a past or future obligation, any property division, or
any allocation of debt between the parties.
18. Tax treatment of the payment by the debtor spouse.
Id.
Many of these factors stemmed from § 308 of the UMDA, which recommended
maintenance criteria as follows:
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage,legal separation, or maintenance
following a decree of dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal
jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a maintenance order for
either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(1) lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that
the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
(b) The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time the court
deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after considering all rele-
vant factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs independently, and the
extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a
sum for that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/12
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dischargeability of marital debts is the so-called present circum-
stances test. The case best known for articulating the present
circumstances test is In re Calhoun.190 The Calhoun court ex-
amined the question in the context of an assumption of joint
debts on the part of the debtor; however, the principles involved
for determining the nature of the award are the same as if the
payments were to be remitted directly to the non-debtor
spouse."' The court stated that it "believe[d] that the initial in-
quiry must be to ascertain whether the state court or the parties
to the divorce intended to create an obligation to provide sup-
port." 92 However, the court maintained that a "finding of intent
does not ... control the ultimate issue of whether the assump-
tion of joint debts was actually in the nature of support for pur-
poses of federal bankruptcy."I93 The next inquiry, according to
the court, was "whether such assumption has the effect of pro-
viding the support necessary to ensure that the daily needs of
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, reprinted in DESK GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (Family Law Reporter ed. 1982); see supra notes 134-36 and
accompanying text.
190. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983); see also In re Warner, 5 B.R. 434,
442 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (holding that "[e]ven if the debt was originally imposed on
the basis of the need of the spouse or children, the debt cannot be held nondischargeable
unless at the time of filing there exists a present need by the spouse or children that the
debt be paid").
191. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
Paragraph (6) excepts from discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of
the debtor for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of the spouse or child. This
language, in combination with the repeal of section 456(b) of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 656(b)) by section 326 of the bill, will apply to make non-discharge-
able only alimony, maintenance, or support owed directly to a spouse or depen-
dent. What constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined
under the bankruptcy law, not State law... The proviso, however, makes dis-
chargeable any debts resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the
debtor's spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent that the agreement is in
payment of alimony, maintenance, or support of the spouse, as determined under
the bankruptcy law considerations as to whether a particular agreement to pay
money to a spouse is actually alimony or a property settlement.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1978) [To accompany H.R. REP. No. 82001,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865; see, e.g., In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(5)(A), a debt to a former spouse that has
been assigned to another entity is dischargeable if it was intended for alimony, mainte-
nance or support).
192. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109.
193. Id.
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the former spouse ... are satisfied."'' 94 Should the daily needs of
the former spouse be capable of being satisfied without the as-
sumption of the obligation on the part of the debtor, then the
inquiry ends, and the debtor is discharged. 19 If, on the other
hand, the obligation "has the effect of providing necessary sup-
port,"'96 then it must still be considered not "manifestly unrea-
sonable in view of the earning power and financial status of the
debtor spouse' 9 7 to be held to be in the nature of support.
Presently, the federal courts are split as to whether present
circumstances are to be taken into account when determining
dischargeability of marital debts. 98 The majority of federal ap-
pellate courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that
if a debt had the necessary features of support at its inception,
then the obligation retains that character for bankruptcy pur-
poses and may not be discharged. 99 Conversely, a minority posi-
tion, advanced primarily by the Sixth Circuit, adopts the view
that at least a limited inquiry into the parties' circumstances at
the time of bankruptcy is necessary to accurately categorize cer-
tain types of marital debts.200
2. Payments to Third Parties or Agreements to Hold
Harmless
Another issue that arises frequently in the bankruptcy and
divorce setting is that of the dischargeability of agreements to
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1110.
197. Id.
198. Scheible, supra note 23, at 606.
199. In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the award was in
the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, and therefore non-dischargeable). In the
court's words: "We believe that whether an obligation is in the nature of alimony, main-
tenance or support, as distinguished from a property settlement, depends on a finding as
to the intent of the parties at the time of the settlement agreement." Id. at 762 (citing In
re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986)); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164, 1166
(10th Cir. 1989); Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1987) (court refusing to
follow Calhoun and holding that award was in the nature of alimony and therefore non-
dischargeable); Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that the needs test
was irrelevant and that the award was in the nature of support and thus dischargeable);
In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 906-07 (11th Cir. 1985); see also In re Miller, 34 B.R. 289,
292 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983)).
200. Scheible, supra note 23, at 604.
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hold harmless and obligations to make payments to third par-
ties. Essentially, the question again turns on whether the obliga-
tion is in the nature of a division of marital property or in the
nature of support.20 1 Courts use the same tests for determining
dischargeability of debts owed to third parties and debts in-
cluded in agreements to hold harmless, as they use when evalu-
ating the indicia of an award that is to be paid by the debtor
directly to the ex-spouse. °20 Accordingly, if a court determines,
for example, that payment on a loan or on a bill for an attor-
ney's fee, is in actuality a property award, then the debt will be
dischargeable and the non-debtor spouse will be liable for that
debt.0 3 If, on the other hand, the court determines that the debt
is in lieu of support, then the debt will be non-dischargeable and
the debtor will be liable for the debt.
For example, the court in In re Barac,"04 noting that "[a]
promise to pay a joint debt can create a non-dischargeable obli-
gation provided its function is support,210 5 nevertheless held
that the debtor's assumption of debt was part of the "division of
property and, hence, is dischargeable."2 06 The court based its
201. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt 95-598 at 365, (1978); H.R. REP. No.
595 (construing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)):
What constitutes alimony, maintenance or support will be determined under the
bankruptcy law, not state law.... This provision, however, makes nondischarge-
able any debts resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor's
spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent that the agreement is in payment of
alimony, maintenance, or support of the spouse as determined under the bank-
ruptcy law considerations as to whether a particular agreement of payment to a
spouse is actually alimony or a property settlement.
In re Coil, 680 F.2d 1170, 1171 (7th Cir. 1982) (hold-harmless clause "was intended as an
integral and inseparable part of the necessary maintenance and support . . . "); In re
Anderson, 62 B.R. 448 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In re Erler, 60 B.R. 220 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1986); In re Petoske, 16 B.R. 412 (Bankr. D. N.Y. 1982).
[The debtor] is not legally obligated to pay creditors by virtue of his promise to
[the non-debtor spouse] in the divorce decree. [The debtor] may, however, be le-
gally obligated to hold [the non-debtor spouse] harmless on these debts, presuma-
bly by paying the creditors, if payment of the debts constitutes "alimony, mainte-
nance, or support."
Warner v. Warner, 5 B.R. 434, 438 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
202. See supra note 186-97 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 186-97 and accompanying text.
204. 62 B.R. 713 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985).
205. Id. at 717.
206. Id.
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holding on the fact that the maintenance award was sufficient,0 7
and that the non-debtor spouse "failed to carry her burden of
proof as to what necessaries the ... obligation related. 20 8
3. Pensions
The question of whether non-debtor spouses are entitled to
retain their interests in debtors' pensions and retirement bene-
fits has also been the basis of extensive litigation within the
framework of bankruptcy and divorce. Here too, some courts
have based their inquiry, into whether a debtor could be dis-
charged from remitting to his ex-spouse that ex-spouse's interest
in the debtor's pension, on whether the award represented an
obligation "in the nature of property"20 9 or "in the nature of
support. ' 210 Thus, each of these courts analyzed each case ac-
cording to the standard for determining the nature of the award
that the court had adopted.1 1
Some courts have held that the non-debtor spouse was enti-
tled to the share of the pension that represented her ex-spouse's
interest in the pension payments based on a theory that these
payments were in reality post-petition debts.21 2 Other courts
have based their conclusions that a debtor is not discharged
from remitting an interest in pension payments to an ex-spouse
on the theory that "an ex-spouse holds pension payments in
trust for the spouse to whom a share of such benefits has been
awarded. 21 3 Other courts arrive at the same conclusion on the
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., In re Neely, 59 B.R. 189, 193-94 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1986) (holding that
"the military pension payments are not in the nature of support but property settlement
and, therefore.... not precluded from discharge under § 523(a)(5)."); In re Anderson, 21
B.R. 335, 339 (Bankr. D. Cal. 1982) (in holding pension award was alimony, not property:
"lilt is clear that the award of 43% of debtor's military retirement benefits, was in-
tended to provide [the ex-spouse] with . . . means of support.").
212. See, e.g., In re Chandler, 805 F.2d, 555, 557 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied Chan-
dler v. Chandler, 481 U.S. 1049 (1987), sub nom., In re Teichman, 774 F.2d 1395 (9th
Cir. 1985) (holding that the debt arose only at the time payment was due from the
debtor to the ex-spouse since no payment was due to ex-spouse until after the debtor
was paid by the Air Force); In re McNierney, 97 B.R. 648, 651 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989).
213. See, e.g., Teichman, 744 F.2d at 1400 (ex-husband invested with control over
benefits belonging to wife was responsible for transferring them to ex-wife under divorce
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premise that the debtor is merely a "conduit" for the payments
to the ex-spouse.214 Still other courts maintain that it is not the
debtor, but the party who pays the pension, who is liable for the
debt; therefore, the debtor is not eligible for such a discharge.
2 1 5
In Bush v. Taylor,' the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the
theory that the debtor's obligation to remit one-half of his pen-
sion benefits to his ex-spouse constituted a constructive trust,
21 7
reversed the courts below, and discharged the debtor from the
obligation.1 8 The court defined this obligation "to remit a per-
centage of pension payments to a former spouse as part of a
property settlement [as] a debt. ' 21' The court continued, "The
Code makes such debts dischargeable .... This result, however
unpalatable, may not be avoided by resort to a new definition of
debt or strained application of equitable devices. "220 However,
on rehearing en banc,22 1 the Eighth Circuit reversed its panel
decision and affirmed the court below, holding that the pension
payments were not dischargeable both on the constructive trust
theory222 and on the theory that the non-debtor spouse's interest
in the debt was a post-petition debt and, therefore, not a debt
dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.223
decree, so that a trust was created) (cited in Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989, 993 (8th Cir.
1992) rev'g 893 F.2d 962 (Fletcher, J., dissenting)); cf. In re Dahlin, 94 B.R. 79, 81
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that "where divorce decree created express trust in favor
of wife, debtor-husband bound to remit payments").
214. See, e.g., In re Mace, 82 B.R. 864, 868 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) ("ex-husband
was merely 'conduit' for payments to former wife from share of pension fund that be-
longed to her) (cited in Bush, 898 F.2d at 965); In re Thomas, 47 B.R. 27, 33 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1984) ("court had no power to modify ex-wife's interest in her separate
property.").
.215. See, e.g., In re Manners, 62 B.R. 656, 657 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986) (holding
wife's "interest in the pension rests with the United States, not the debtor."); In re Hall,
51 B.R. 1002, 1003 (S.D. Ga. 1985) (holding wife "became a federal pensioner in her own
right when she received an equitable share of her husband's pension").
216. 893 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.), rev'd en banc, 912 F.2d 989 (1990).
217. Id. at 966.
218. Id. at 963.
219. Id. at 967.
220. Id.
221. Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'g 893 F.2d 962 (1990).
222. Id. at 993. "[The non-debtor spouse's] share of the pension was her sole and
separate property and [the debtor] received it ... as a constructive trustee for her bene-
fit." Id.
223. Id.
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In McCarty v. McCarty,224 a 1981 United States Supreme
Court case, the Court held that federal law preempts state com-
munity property law and that, consequently, a state court was
precluded by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution from dividing military nondisability retirement pay pur-
suant to a state's community property laws. 25 The Court ex-
amined the relevant statute, 10 U.S.C. § 3929, which provides:
"A member of the Army retired under this chapter is entitled to
retired pay. 22 6 Moreover, the Court continued, "the military re-
tirement system does not embody even a limited 'community
property concept.' "227 The Court noted that "Congress ha[d] ex-
plicitly stated: 'Historically, military retired pay has been a per-
sonal entitlement payable to the retired member himself as long
as he lives.' "228
The Court also observed that, in contrast to its treatment of
military benefits, Congress had "enacted legislation that requires
that Civil Service benefits be paid to an ex-spouse to the extent
provided for in 'the terms of any court order or court-approved
property settlement agreement incident to any court decree of
divorce, annulment, or legal separation.' ",229 It also noted that
there was legislation pursuant to which "an ex-spouse is entitled
to a pro rata share of Foreign Service retirement benefits. '2 0
Thus, the Court continued, "the Civil Service amendments re-
quire the United States to recognize the community property di-
vision of Civil Service retirement benefits by a state court, while
the Foreign Service amendments establish a limited federal
community property concept. '21  However, the Court said, "in
striking contrast,' '232 comparable "legislation affecting military
retired pay was introduced in the 96th Congress, [and] none of
224. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
225. Id. at 223.
226. Id. at 223, 224 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 3929 (1976)).
227. Id. at 223.
228. Id. at 224 (quoting S. REP. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968) (emphasis
added)).
229. Id. at 230 (quoting Pub. L. No. 95-366 § 1(a), 92 Stat. 600, 5 U.S.C.
§ 8345()(1) (Supp. IV 1976)).
230. Id. at 230, 231.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 231.
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those bills was reported out of committee."23 s
A year after the McCarty decision, Congress enacted the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act of 1982
("USFSPA") 4 Section 1408(d)(1) of the USFSPA provides, in
relevant part:
After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order
providing for the payment of child support or alimony or, with
respect to a division of property, specifically providing for the
payment of an amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay
from a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the member,
the Secretary shall make payments (subject to the limitations of
this section) from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the
member to the spouse or a former spouse in an amount sufficient
to satisfy the amount of child support and alimony set forth in
the court order, and with respect to a division of property, in the
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay specifically provided
for in the court order. 23 5
Congress is generally considered to have enacted the USFSPA as
a direct response to the McCarty decision, in order to preclude
an outcome analogous to that in McCarty.3 6
Another federal statute that protects non-debtor spouses'
interests in debtors' pensions is section 1056 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").237 ERISA, which
governs private pension plans, generally prohibits the alienation
of benefits under such plans;23 8 however, a 1984 amendment to
ERISA ensures that a non-debtor spouse is not deprived of the
non-debtor spouse's share of a pension.2 9 The amendment pro-
233. Id.
234. Pub. L. No. 98-525, Subsec. 634(c)(1) (codified as 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988)).
235. Id. (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(1) (1988)).
236. Mary A Throne, Pension Awards in Divorce & Bankruptcy, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
194, 208-11 (1988); see also Stephanie K. Cardoes et al., The Uniformed Services
Spouses Protection Act, 33 FED. B. NEWS & J. Jan. 1986, at 33; Carol Manashil, The
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act of 1982: Problems Resulting from
its Application, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 83 (1985).
237. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
238. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (1988).
239. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988). "Congress enacted this 1984 exception to the
anti-alienation law 'to guarantee that the Nation's private retirement income-system
provided fair treatment for women.'" Bush v. Taylor, 912 F.2d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collections, 486 U.S. 825, 838 (1988)). "We doubt that Con-
gress ever intended that a former wife's judicially decreed sole and separate property
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vides that a state court, pursuant to a qualified domestic rela-
tions order ("QDRO") may assign rights in a pension plan to a
former spouse.2 40 These rights would not be subject to the
debtor's bankruptcy proceeding.
241
4. Liens
a. The Statutes
A "lien," as defined by the Bankruptcy Code, is a "charge
against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation. 2 42 The Bankruptcy Code makes
reference to three types of liens:
1) security interests, which are: lien[s] created by an agree-
ment;24 3 2) statutory liens, which are "lien[s] arising solely by
force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions, or lien
of distress for rent, whether. or not statutory, but [do] not include
security interest[s] or judicial lien[s], whether or not such interest
or lien is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or
not such interest or lien is made fully effective by statute;24' and
3) judicial liens, which are "[1]iens obtained by judgement, levy,
sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or
proceeding.
2
1
5
Section 522, the exemptions section of the Bankruptcy
Code, allows a debtor to exempt certain property from the bank-
ruptcy estate. Section 522 provides in pertinent part:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may
avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property
to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the
debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, if such lien is . . . (1) a judicial lien.246
interest in a pension payable to her former husband should be subservient to the Bank-
ruptcy Code's goal of giving a debtor a fresh start." Id. at 994.
240. Bush, 912 F.2d at 993.
241. Id. at 994.
242. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (1988).
243. 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) (1988).
244. 11 U.S.C. § 101(47) (1988).
245. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988).
246. "11 U.S.C. 522(f)(1) allows the debtor to undo the actions of creditors that
bring legal action against the debtor shortly before bankruptcy. Bankruptcy exists to
provide relief for an overburdened debtor. If a creditor beats the debtor into court, the
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Section 522 provides that an individual debtor may exempt from
property of the estate "[tihe debtor's aggregate interest, not to
exceed $7,500 in value, in real property or personal property
that the debtor ... uses as a residence. 24 7 This is the so-called
homestead property exemption.
Property that has been included in a debtor's estate,248 and
then properly exempted by him,2 9 can nevertheless be subject
to a valid lien if the creditor has a pre-existing interest in the
property.2 50 A lien cannot be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)
unless three factors are satisfied: 1) the lien must attach to an
interest of the debtor in property;251 2) the lien must impair an
exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be entitled;2 52
and 3) the lien must be a judicial lien.253 Otherwise exempt
homestead property is included in the category of exempt prop-
erty that is subject to valid liens.2 54 This principle was generally
preserved by Congress in its revision of the Code. 55
"[D]ischarge in bankruptcy will not prevent the enforcement of
valid liens - even on exempt property. '256
debtor is nevertheless entitled to his exemptions." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 71, at
126. "Subsection (e) protects the debtor's exemptions, his discharge, and thus his fresh
start by permitting him to avoid certain liens on property. The debtor may avoid a judi-
cial lien on any property to the extent that the property could have been exempted in
the absence of the lien ...... S.R. No. 989, at 6 reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5862. "Sec-
tion 522(f)(1) thus allows the debtor to avoid a lien if it is 1) a judicial lien [; and] 2) on
an interest of the debtor in property." Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 1988).
247. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1988).
248. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
250. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.04 (15th ed. 1992); In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d
598, 606 (7th Cir. 1990) ("It is settled in the nonfamily context that a debtor cannot
avoid a lien on an interest acquired after the lien attached.") (citing In re McCormick,
18 B.R. 911 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982)); In re Stephens, 15 B.R. 485 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
1981)).
251. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
252. U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988). See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
253. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988); Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 1988)
("Section 522(f)(1) thus allows the debtor to avoid a lien if it is 1) a judicial lien, 2) on an
interest of the debtor in property.").
254. Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886); S. REP. No. 598 supra note 69,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5862 explains section 522 exemptions: "Subsection (c).
. . The rule of Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886) (citation omitted) is accepted with
respect to the enforcement of valid liens on nonexempt property as well as on exempt
property." Cf. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 583 (1935)."
255. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. at 1829 (construing the Bankruptcy Code).
256. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 522.04, at 522-17 (15th ed. 1992); see also Long, 117
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b. Pre-Sanderfoot
In all but one257 of the cases discussed below, which were
decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sanderfoot v.
Farrey,258 there is a common set of underlying facts. Husband
and wife divorce and, pursuant to either a consensual agreement
or a court ordered settlement, one of the spouses is awarded the
marital homestead property and in exchange is obligated to pay
the other spouse her equity in the homestead property. The re-
cipient of the homestead property subsequently files for bank-
ruptcy, exempts the homestead property from his bankruptcy
estate to the extent permitted by applicable law, and seeks to
avoid paying his wife her equity in the property by claiming that
he is entitled to discharge the obligation.
There was disagreement among the Circuit Courts with re-
spect to the factors that warrant lien avoidance. The Eighth Cir-
cuit held that such liens could not be avoided because the non-
debtor spouse has a pre-existing interest in the property at is-
sue.259 The Ninth Circuit held that such liens could be avoided
because Congress intended that "'property settlements should
be treated the same as other debts in bankruptcy.' "260 The
Tenth Circuit held that the issue turned on whether or not the
instrument that awarded the property to the debtor specified
"free and clear." 261
In Boyd v. Robinson,262 the Eighth Circuit, articulated a
new theory, that of a pre-existing property interest,2 3 and held
that the debtor could not avoid the non-debtor spouse's lien
under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). 2 " The court stated that, for present
purposes, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) "establishes two requirements
for avoiding a lien: (1) the lien must attach to an interest of the
U.S. at 620-21.
257. In re Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1984); see infra notes 293-98 and accom-
panying text.
258. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
259. Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1115 (8th Cir. 1984).
260. In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Boyd v. Robinson,
741 F.2d 1112, 1116 (Ross, J., dissenting)).
261. See infra notes 275-92 and accompanying text.
262. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
263. Id. at 1114.
264. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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debtor in exempt property; [and] (2) the lien must be a judicial
lien." '265 In applying the first prong of this test, the Boyd court
held "that the lien imposed by the state court does not attach to
an interest of [the debtor], but rather protects a pre-existing in-
terest of [the non-debtor] in the homestead that was created
under Minnesota law prior to the marriage dissolution." '266 The
non-debtor spouse's pre-existing interest arose by virtue of her
right, during the marriage, to approve or reject conveyance of
the homestead, her contribution of non-marital funds toward
improving the property, and her having made part of the mort-
gage payments.2"7
In a strong dissent, Judge Ross disagreed with the reasoning
of both the majority and the court below.2 68 The order of the
state court that dissolved the marriage and distributed the prop-
erty, he said, dissolved the non-debtor spouse's interest in the
house and replaced it with the debt which was to be enforced by
a lien on the house.2 69 Accordingly, he maintained, "[w]hat had
been a property interest became simply collateral for a debt."27
The Ninth Circuit, in In re Pederson,271 disagreed with the
Eight Circuit's analysis in Boyd and held that the lien was
avoidable to the extent that it impaired the debtor's homestead
exemption. 272 The court found that the money award "was not
in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support [and thus]
would have been dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523 (a)(5)."27 The court reasoned that permitting the hus-
band "to avoid a lien securing such a dischargeable property set-
tlement [was] consistent with Congress's provision 'that prop-
erty settlements should be treated the same as other debts in
bankruptcy.' ",274
265. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1113.
266. Id. at 1114 (emphasis added).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1115 (Ross, J., dissenting).
269. Id. Judge Ross agreed that the non-debtor had originally had a pre-existing
interest in the house, but said that interest was held prior to the order which "gave the
house outright to [the debtor], subject to [the non-debtor spouse's] lien." Id.
270. Id.
271. 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989).
272. Id. at 783.
273. Pederson, 875 F.2d at 784.
274. Id. (quoting Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1116 (Ross, J., dissenting)).
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In Maus v. Maus,7 the Tenth Circuit also rejected Boyd's
pre-existing interest theory, calling it a "convoluted theory" 76
whose defect was that "the decree gives one party title outright
and that is the interest to which the lien attaches. 2 7 7 The court
observed that "[m]any courts have struggled to find theories
under which a lien to enforce a property settlement survives
bankruptcy."" 8 The Maus court held that the debtor could
avoid the non-debtor spouse's "claim either if it [was] merely a
debt stemming from a property settlement rather than a lien, or
if it [was] a judicial lien on [the debtor's] own property, 2 79 be-
cause the divorce decree had awarded the property to the debtor
as "sole and separate property, free and clear of any and all
claims. 2 80 The court added that it was unnecessary to decide if,
under Kansas law, "a money judgment in a divorce decree can
give rise to a lien on homestead property ... when the decree
does not specifically create a lien,"281 because "[e]ven if such a
lien were created . . . it would be a judicial lien as defined in 11
U.S.C. §101(27). "282
In In re Donahue,83 the Tenth Circuit held that the non-
debtor's interest represented an equitable lien against the prop-
erty which secured the debt. 84 The debtor had been awarded a
"piece of property... 'subject to' a monetary judgment awarded
to" the non-debtor spouse.28 5 The court distinguished Donahue
from its earlier decision in Maus. Whereas in Maus the divorce
decree "explicitly awarded the property to the debtor spouse
'free and clear of any claims of the non-debtor spouse,'" the
court noted in Donahue that "the divorce decree itself clearly
contemplated the creation of a lien or security interest of some
kind in favor of [the non-debtor spouse] and against the
275. 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988).
276. Id. at 939 (citing In re Boyd, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984)).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 938.
280. Id. at 937 (quoting Divorce Decree of Nikki and Jesse Maus, Jul. 31, 1981)
(emphasis modified).
281. Id. at 938.
282. Id.
283. 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988).
284. Id. at 266.
285. Id. at 260.
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Property. 28 6
The Tenth Circuit also decided In re Borman,8 7 wherein
the non-debtor spouse conceded that she had a judicial lien, but
claimed the debt was "not dischargeable in that the judicial lien
was designed to secure the payment of court decreed ali-
mony. 28 8 The court held that the lien was unavoidable for an-
other reason and distinguished its decision from its holding in
Maus. The Borman court reasoned that in Maus the non-debtor
spouse had received a money judgment and the debtor had re-
ceived the homestead property free and clear of any and all
claims of the non-debtor spouse. The court further noted that
the issue in Maus was "limited to . . . whether a money judg-
ment awarded in a divorce decree can give rise to a lien on
homestead property when the divorce decree itself does not spe-
cifically create a lien."28 The court said that the facts of Bor-
man were more similar to those in Donahue, where the non-
debtor spouse received a money judgement against the debtor,
payable upon the debtor's remarriage, sale, or encumbrance of
the homestead property.290 When the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy and claimed the property as exempt homestead property,
the Donahue court held that the non-debtor spouse "had an eq-
uitable lien against the property .. "291 The critical difference
between Maus and Donahue was "that the decree in Maus
awarded the property to the debtor spouse free and clear of any
286. Id. at 265 (emphasis added). See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
The court further observed:
[a] number of courts have recognized that an equitable lien against property may
arise in a situation such as the one before us today. "An equitable lien is a crea-
ture of equity, is based on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, and is the
right to have a fund or specific property applied to the payment of a particular
debt."
Donahue, 862 F.2d at 265 (quoting Caldwell v. Armstrong, 342 F.2d 485, 490 (10th Cir.
1965)). The court also noted that " '[in] some cases equitable liens have been imposed by
bankruptcy courts when ex-spouses filed bankruptcy primarily to avoid compliance with
the property division provisions of their divorce decrees.' "Id. (quoting In re Sanderfoot,
83 B.R. 564, 569 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988)).
287. 866 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989).
288. Id. at 274.
289. Borman, 886 F.2d at 274.
290. Id. at 274 (citing In re Donahue, 862 F.2d at 259 (10th Cir. 1988)).
291. Id.
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claims of the non-debtor spouse.
In re Seablom293 and In re Rittenhouse,9  both federal
bankruptcy court cases, followed Boyd's pre-existing interest
theory. Seablom followed Boyd in a somewhat roundabout way.
In Seablom, the property involved was income property, held by
the parties as joint tenants during their marriage, whose convey-
ance by the non-debtor to the debtor was conditioned upon pay-
ment by him of a money settlement. 95 Since the property was
not homestead property, and not claimed by the debtor as an
exemption to the bankruptcy estate, the issue became whether
the property was to go into the debtor's general estate from
which all his creditors' claims would be satisfied, or whether the
non-debtor spouse had a lien upon the property that would enti-
tle the non-debtor to her interest in the property.296 Although
the divorce decree had not specifically granted the non-debtor a
lien on the property, the bankruptcy court determined that from
"the testimony ... and the totality of the decree itself ... this
was the intent of the parties as well as the state court. '297 The
court then held that, "[a]ccordingly, the lien created by the di-
vorce decree to protect [the non-debtor's] right to payment did
not attach to an interest of the estate but only protected a pre-
existing property interest." '298
The In re Rittenhouse court 29 noted the attempts by many
courts to "find theories under which a lien to enforce a property
settlement survives bankruptcy. '" 300 "[T]hree of the 'survival'
theories,"3 1 said the court, are "equitable lien, consensual lien,
and a lien which does not attach to debtor's existing property
interest.302 The Rittenhouse court then looked to the decisions
in the Tenth Circuit to determine if there was any binding pre-
292. Id. (emphasis added).
293. 45 B.R. 445 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
294. 103 B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989).
295. Seablom, 45 B.R. at 450.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 451.
298. Id. "The lien is not avoidable under section 522(f)(1) because it did not attach
to any interests of the Debtors in the property." Id.
299. 103 B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989).
300. Id. at 252 (quoting Maus, 837 F.2d at 939).
301. Id.
302. Id.
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cedent that would have to be followed in reaching its holding.
Given that the Tenth Circuit in Donahue3 0 3 had not resolved the
issue of avoidability under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1), 304 the court
opined that "the state of the law on the three theories [was]
somewhat uncertain." 05 However, the court continued, it "is
clear ... that the Tenth Circuit has not foreclosed the availabil-
ity of any of the three theories and has made each factually de-
pendent upon primarily the terms of the divorce decree. 3 ' The
court went on to determine that, under Kansas law, "once a pe-
tition for divorce is filed 'each spouse becomes the owner of a
vested, but undetermined, interest in all the property individu-
ally or jointly held.' ,,so7 In Rittenhouse, said the court, "[t]he
divorce decree both creates a lien in favor of one spouse and
conveys some interest to the other spouse. "30 Accordingly, the
court held, the lien could not be avoided because "[tihe interest
transferred to the debtor/spouse is already subject to the lien,
thereby making § 522(f)(1) unavailable. 30 9
Some courts, in the absence of an applicable statute, hold
that in order to avoid unjust enrichment, a finding of the exis-
tence of an "equitable lien"310 is warranted.3 11 The federal bank-
ruptcy court in In re Hart"' held that the non-debtor spouse
had a valid lien against the debtor's property which could not be
avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1),31 3 basing its conclusion on
303. In re Donahue, 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988).
304. Rittenhouse, 103 B.R. at 253 (construing 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988)).
305. Id. at 254.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 255 (quoting Cady v. Cady, 581 P.2d 358, 362-63 (Kan. 1978)).
308. Id. at 255-56.
309. Id. at 256 (construing 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988)).
310. An "equitable lien" is " '[t]he right not recognized at law, to have a fund or
specific property, or its proceeds, applied to the payment of a debt.'" In re Hart, 50 B.R.
956, 959-60 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985) (quoting 6 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW I 26.02(C)(2) (Mat-
thew Bender 1982)). "Equitable liens may arise either by express contract showing intent
to secure an obligation by a charge to particular property, or by implication from the
conduct and dealings of the parties." Id. at 960 (citing 6 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW
26.02(C)(2) (Matthew Bender 1982)).
311. See, e.g., In re Hart, 50 B.R. 956, 960 ("An equitable lien may also be created
by judicial decree. Substance must prevail over form. Therefore, 'if a transaction resolves
itself into a security, whatever its form or the name given to it, it is in equity a lien.' ")
(quoting 6 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 26.02(C)(2)).
312. 50 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985).
313. Id. at 963.
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the intent of the parties. The court noted that "the apparent
intent of the parties was to create a lien in specific property of
the debtor ... representing the [non-debtor's] equity therein."" 4
Thus, "the lien [arose] either by virtue of an express agreement
or, at least, the imposition of an equitable lien to carry out the
parties' intent."3" As such, the lien "qualified" as a security in-
terest rather than a judicial lien. 16 Moreover, "the fact that the
lien was perfected and embodied in a judgment shortly before
the petition will not subject the lien to the debtor's avoiding
powers . . . since the source of the lien was the voluntary agree-
ment of the debtor. 3 1 7 An equitable lien, added the Hart court,
"may also be created by a judicial decree. Substance must pre-
vail over form. '3 1 8
In two noteworthy Wisconsin cases, the federal bankruptcy
courts based their decisions as to whether the liens in question
were avoidable upon a determination of whether or not the liens
were mortgages. In Wozniak v. Wozniak, '9 the trial court had
awarded the debtor an interest in a parcel of real estate which
was subject to a lien of the non-debtor spouse. The purpose of
the lien was to secure payment of an interest-bearing debt, and
it specified the date when payment on the debt was due and
allowable expenses of foreclosure.320 The court stated that
"[w]hile a mortgage serves as a security for a particular piece of
property, a judgment lien ordinarily is not a lien on any specific
real estate of the judgment debtor but is a general lien on all of
the debtor's real property."32 The court gave deference to the
314. Id. at 961.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 961-62.
317. Id. at 962 (construing 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)(A) (1988)).
318. Id. at 960 (citing 6 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW V 26.02 (c)(2) (Matthew Bender
1982)). "Therefore, 'if a transaction resolves itself into a security, whatever its form or
the name given to it by the parties, it is in equity a lien.'" Id. (quoting 6 DEBTOR-CREDI-
TOR LAW 26.02 (c)(2) (Matthew Bender 1982)).
319. 359 N.W.2d 147 (Wis. 1984).
320. Id. at 148.
321. Id. at 149 (citing 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 455 (1947)). Whereas a mortgage is "a
pledge or security of particular property for the payment of a debt or the performance of
some other obligation, whatever form the transaction may take." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1010 (6th ed. 1990). A judgement lien is "[a] lien binding the real estate of a judg-
ment debtor, in favor of the holder of the judgment, and giving the latter a right to levy
on the property for the satisfaction of his judgment to the exclusion of other adverse
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decision of the trial court that had divided the marital property,
as to whether the lien in question was a judgment lien or a mort-
gage.322 The court also found that the fact that the trial court
had considered "the enforcement of the secured interest by
means of a foreclosure action is persuasive evidence that the
trial court awarded a mortgage interest in the property,''323 since
a judgment lien is enforced by execution on the debtor's prop-
erty.32 4 Finally, the court outlined the characteristics that it had
compiled to define a mortgage lien. A mortgage lien is "on a spe-
cific parcel of real estate as security for the payment of a sum of
money, bearing interest at a specific rate, and due at a specific
date, 3 25 as well as a judgment that mentions "the possibility of
[the non-debtor] bringing a foreclosure action to secure
payment. 3 26
In In re Duncan,27 the property in question consisted of a
farm which had been the homestead of the debtor prior to and
during the marriage.3 28 The Circuit Court for Jackson County,
Wisconsin issued a Memorandum Decision pursuant to which
the non-debtor spouse was to receive a sum of money " '[a]s a
full, final and complete settlement.' ",329 The settlement was sub-
ject to being payable on a specified date and was "[a] lien upon
the entire farm of [the debtor]."330 In event of default, the prop-
interests subsequent to the judgment." Id. at 845.
322. Wozniak, 359 N.W.2d at 150. "In determining what type of lien was created by
the divorce judgment, we note that the trial court has broad powers to divide property in
divorce actions." Id. at 149.
The mere form of an instrument cuts but very little figure in respect to whether it
is enforceable as a mortgage or not upon its character being called in question in a
legal or equitable action, as those terms are used under our system. The purpose
of the instrument is the controlling feature under all circumstances. If that is
security and the facts of the matter are established in any action involving the
subject, the instrument is treated as a mortgage and nothing else.
Id. at 150 (quoting Smith v. Pfluger, 105 N.W. 476 (Wis. 1905) (emphasis added)).
323. Id. at 150.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. The court added that "[t]o avoid the problem created by the judgment in
this case, trial courts should specify in the divorce judgment the type of lien awarded."
Id.
327. 85 B.R. 80 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 81.
330. Id.
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erty was to be transferred to a trustee and sold to the highest
bidder.3 1 The Memorandum Decision further specified that, in
the event that the amount received for the property was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the sum awarded to the non-debtor, the debtor
would be responsible for paying the difference to the non-
debtor, over time, with twelve percent interest.3 2
The district court framed the issue as "whether a lien on
exempt property granted under a divorce judgment to secure
payment of a property settlement may be avoided under
§ 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. '" 3 Concurring with the
reasoning of the dissent in Boyd, the district court vacated the
bankruptcy court's decision and remanded, noting that subse-
quent to the bankruptcy court's decision in Duncan, the reason-
ing of the Boyd dissent had also been embraced by both the
Tenth Circuit in deciding Maus, and the Bankruptcy Appeals
Panel for the Ninth Circuit in deciding Pederson.3 "4 First, the
court said, the non-debtor's spouse's lien did attach to an inter-
est of the debtor because "whatever interest [the non-debtor
spouse] had was extinguished by the divorce decree and ... the
debtor obtained sole ownership of the property, subject only to
the [non-debtor spouse's] lien. ' 33 5 Second, the court said, the
lien granted to the non-debtor was a "judicial lien "336 and not an
equitable mortgage or security interest.33 7 It was irrelevant to
the court "that the Wisconsin state court [had] held that such a
lien [was] to be foreclosed under the mortgage statutes ....
"If state law were allowed to vary what would otherwise be a
judicial lien by merely calling the interest an 'equitable mort-
gage,' havoc would result." '39
331. Id.
332. Id. (citations omitted).
333. Id. at 82.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. "The federal definition of 'judicial lien' is unambiguous and must control in
this instance." Id. at 83 (referencing McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 369-70
(1945)).
337. Id. "Section 101(45) states that 'security interest' means 'lien created by an
agreement.' Here, it is absolutely undisputed that the lien was not created by agreement
but was created in a disputed divorce trial." Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. (quoting Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1115 (Ross, J., dissenting)).
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The court also deemed the fact that the "lien attached only
to one piece of the debtor's property" plainly irrelevant to the
issue of whether it was a judicial lien under the Bankruptcy
Code. 4 It found that since § 523(a)(5) provides "that only
maintenance and support obligations are nondischargeable,
there is little justification to hold that a lien enforcing a dis-
chargeable property division debt should be unavoidable. '34 1
The court concluded by declaring that it "decline[d] to join the
herd of prior courts who have trampled the Bankruptcy Code in
a rush to achieve their own perception of justice in the divorce
setting. 342
D. Sanderfoot
1. The Divorce Judgment
On September 12, 1986, Jeanne and Gerald Sanderfoot were
divorced after 20 years of marriage. 43 Within four months of the
entry of the decree of divorce, Gerald Sanderfoot filed for bank-
ruptcy.3 44 The Divorce Judgment provided, in relevant part:
IX. PROPERTY DIVISION
Real Estate-House. The Court awards the real estate-house to
the Respondent herein [Gerald Sanderfoot] for $104,000.
XI. PROPERTY BALANCE PAYOUT FROM RESPONDENT
TO PETITIONER AND PROPERTY BALANCE SHEET
The Court hereby orders the respondent to pay to the Petitioner
the amount of $29,208.44, all as follows:
1. $14,604.22 shall be paid from the Respondent to the Petitioner
on or before January 10, 1987 ....
2. $14,604.22 shall be paid from the Respondent to the Petitioner
on or before April 10, 1987 ....
The Petitioner herein shall have a lien against the real estate
property of the Respondent for the total amount of money due
her pursuant to this Order of the Court, i.e. $29,208.44, and the
340. Id.
341. Id. (citation omitted).
342. Id.
343. Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991) (No.
90-350).
344. In re Sanderfoot, 83 B.R. 564, 566 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988).
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lien shall remain attached to the real estate property of the Re-
spondent until the total amount of money is paid in full. Specifi-
cally, the lien shall attach to the house/real estate of the Respon-
dent...
The Oral Decision of the Court, as set forth above, is consid-
ered a full, final, complete and equitable property division in rec-
ognition of a species of community ownership of the marital es-
tate resembling a division of the property between co-owners
vested at the time of the commencement of this action.
21. Divesting of Property Rights: Mutual Releases. Each party
shall be divested of and waives, renounces and gives up, any and
all right, titles and interest in and to the property awarded to
the other. All property and money received or retained by the
parties shall be the separate property of the respective parties,
free and clear of any right, title, interest or claim of the other
party, and each party shall have the right to deal with, and dis-
pose of his or her separate property as fully and effectively as if
the parties had never been married, except as expressly provided
for in this agreement, and each party accepts the property herein
in full satisfaction of all property rights and all obligations arising
out of the marital relationship of the parties.34
A trial was held on the issues of maintenance, child support, and
division of property, since there was no agreement between the
parties regarding these matters. 4 6
2. The Bankruptcy Petition
In May 4, 1987, "[flour months after entry of the decree of
divorce,34 7 Gerald Sanderfoot filed a voluntary petition for bank-
ruptcy under title 11 of the United States Code in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wiscon-
sin.3 48 Attached to Sanderfoot's petition for bankruptcy, was
Schedule B-i, Statement of All Property of Debtor.4 Statement
B-i, which set forth the requirement that it "must include all
property of the debtor as of the date of the filing of the petition
345. Divorce Judgment at 51a, 56a-58a (In re Sanderfoot, No. 84-FA-657
(Outagamie County Ct. Wis. 1986) (emphases added).
346. In re Sanderfoot, 83 B.R. 564, 565 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988).
347. Id. at 566.
348. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 44a, Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990) (No. 90-350).
349. Id. at 48a.
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by or against him, 's 0 listed the "Residence located at 540 Island
Road, Route 2, Hortonville, WI 54944 ' '351 under the heading:
Description and location of all real property in which debtor has
an interest (including . . . rights and powers exercisable for his
own benefit).3 5 2
Statement B-1 set forth the figure, $72,000.00, under the
heading:
Market value of debtor's interest with deduction for secured
claims listed in Schedule A-2 or exemptions claimed in Schedule
B-4.353
In other words,
Mr. Sanderfoot listed the marital home on the schedule of assets
submitted with his bankruptcy petition, identifying it as exempt
homestead property and Ms. Farrey's lien as "[d]isputed[,]"
[and] listed marital home on the schedule of assets filed with the
bankruptcy petition . . . designating the family's home as exempt
homestead property under Wisconsin law. Mr. Sanderfoot next
filed a motion under § 522(f)(1) in which he asked the bank-
ruptcy court for permission "to avoid Ms. Farrey's lien against
the property, claiming it was a judicial lien that impaired his
homestead exemption.
354
3. The Bankruptcy Court
The bankruptcy court denied Sanderfoot's motion.3 55 Al-
though the court found that Farrey's 35" lien was a judicial lien, 35 7
the court applied the test for lien avoidance under 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f)(1) and held that Farrey's lien could not be avoided be-
cause it protected her pre-existing interest in the marital prop-
erty. 58 The court noted that, from the record, it was not clear
whether the parties had owned the homestead as joint tenants or
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Brief for Petitioner at 8, In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
355. In re Sanderfoot, 83 B.R. 564 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988).
356. See supra note 345.
357. Sanderfoot, 83 B.R. at 566 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)).
358. Id. (construing 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)).
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tenants in common.35 9 If Mrs. Sanderfoot was a co-owner, the
court said, "and the divorce judgment conveyed her interest to
the debtor, Mr. Sanderfoot took the property subject to her lien
[in which case] the lien did not attach to the interest of the
debtor, and [was] not avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). 360
However, the court continued, the issue of whether Mrs.
Sanderfoot held title prior to the divorce was not dispositive
here.361 The court, noting that Wisconsin law provides for "equi-
table property division at divorce,' 362 applied the reasoning of
Boyd and stated:
In a divorce proceeding, the document which conveys one
spouse's interest in the homestead to the other spouse simultane-
ously creates a lien in favor of the spouse who will no longer be
allowed to live in the residence. In effect, the property is con-
veyed to the debtor subject to a lien to secure payment of the
nonresident spouse's share of the property settlement."3
The court also observed that the "legislative history makes
clear that the policy behind 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) was not to cir-
cumvent a divorce court's decision by allowing one spouse to ac-
quire substantially all of the predivorce assets to the exclusion of
the other."364 And, in the court's words, "Mr. Sanderfoot is at-
tempting to manipulate bankruptcy law for this very purpose,
and to permit such a result would be inequitable and contrary to
public policy. 136 5
Accordingly, the court held that, "regardless of how title
was previously held, the debtor acquired his interest by virtue of
the divorce judgement and subject to the lien. The lien did not
attach to the debtor's interest, and [thus, was] not avoidable."3 6
359. Id. at 568.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. (citations omitted).
363. Id. at 567 (citing In re Thomas, 32 B.R. at 12).
364. Id. at 566. The court noted that "[slection 522(f) permits avoidance of the 'fix-
ing of a lien on an interest of the debtor.'" Id. at 567 (emphasis in original). The court
reasoned that this language and the House Report implied the intent by Congress that
liens could not be avoided if they became fixed before "the debtor's acquisition of inter-
est in the property." Id. (citing In re Williams, 38 B.R. 224, 226-27 (Bankr. N.D. Okl.
1984)).
365. Id. at 566.
366. Id. at 568.
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4. The United States District Court
Mr. Sanderfoot then appealed to the United States District
Court of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which reversed the
order that had denied Sanderfoot's motion under §522(f).8 7 The
court noted that there was no dispute that the lien that im-
paired Mr. Sanderfoot's homestead exemption was a judicial
lien.3"' The court agreed with the reasoning in Maus v. Maus"6 9
and pronounced itself unable to accept the theory, followed by
the bankruptcy court and articulated in Boyd, T0 that the debtor
acquired the property subject to a lien attached to the "pre-ex-
isting property interest of the non-debtor spouse."37' The court
quoted the Tenth Circuit in Maus, which had called this a "con-
voluted theory" in that, as the dissent in Boyd pointed out, "the
decree gives one party title outright and that is the interest to
which the lien attaches."372
Thus, the court determined that the divorce decree had ex-
tinguished the parties' pre-existing interests in the property and
simultaneously created new interests, and that Mr. Sanderfoot
could "avoid Mrs. Sanderfoot's lien pursuant to § 522(f)(1) be-
cause he ha[d] met all of the statutory requirements of that
section. 3173
The district court noted that the issue had not yet been ad-
dressed by the Seventh Circuit. However, the court also ob-
served that in In re Duncan,3 7 4 the only other district court in
Wisconsin to address "the identical issue" had, unlike the bank-
ruptcy court in Sanderfoot, rejected the reasoning of Boyd.s75
Accordingly, the court decided that Mr. Sanderfoot had "met all
of the statutory requirements" of § 522(f)(1). 376
367. In re Sanderfoot, 92 B.R. 802 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
368. Id. at 803.
369. 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
370. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1112. See supra notes 262-267 and accompanying text.
371. Sanderfoot, 92 B.R. at 803.
372. Id. (quoting Maus, 837 F.2d at 939 (citing Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1112) (sic)).
373. Id.
374. 85 B.R. 80 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
375. Sanderfoot, 92 B.R. at 803.
376. Id.
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5. The Seventh Circuit
Ms. Farrey then appealed the district court's decision to the
Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit. 77 A divided panel of
the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the divorce proceed-
ing had extinguished any pre-existing interest that Farrey had in
the homestead. Her new interest, the court said, which had been
"created in the dissolution order and evidenced by her lien, at-
tached to Mr. Sanderfoot's interest in the property. ' 37 The cir-
cuit court noted that the bankruptcy court had "conceded that
the lien is 'without question a type of judicial lien,' ,,"7' and that
the district court had concluded that the lien was a judicial lien
and could not be avoided.3 10 The Seventh Circuit observed that
Ms. Farrey's lien, which had been granted by the Wisconsin Cir-
cuit Court for Outagamie County, had therefore been "obtained
by 'legal proceedings.' "a381 This, the Seventh Circuit said, was a
transaction that fits squarely within the Code's definition of a
judicial lien "as a lien obtained by judgement, levy, sequestra-
tion, or other legal process or proceeding.'" 382 Consequently, the
circuit court concluded, since "it is clear from the face of the
statute that Ms. Farrey has a judicial lien that impairs Mr.
Sanderfoot's homestead exemption, we conclude that the lien is
avoidable under section 522(f) (1). '"383
The court made note of the Tenth Circuit's observation in
Maus v. Maus384 "that '[m]any courts have struggled to find the-
ories under which a lien to enforce a property settlement sur-
vives bankruptcy.' "385 The Seventh Circuit went on to discuss
the split among the circuit courts on the issue, and also observed
that the district court in In re Duncan had held that whatever
interest the non-debtor spouse had in the property at issue "was
377. In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1990).
378. Id. at 602.
379. Id. at 603 (quoting Sanderfoot, 83 B.R. at 566).
380. Id. (citing Sanderfoot, 83 B.R. at 566).
381. Id.
382. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)) (emphasis added).
383. Id. at 605.
384. 837 F.2d 935, 959 (10th Cir. 1988).
385. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 603 (quoting Maus, 837 F.2d at 939) (alteration in
original).
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extinguished by the divorce decree .... 386 In Duncan, the dis-
trict court said, "[a]s in the instant case, the lien was created in
and by the divorce decree 3 87 and the court agreed with the
Duncan court that to uphold the lien would directly conflict
"with 'the unambiguous language' of section 522 .... 88
The Seventh Circuit in Sanderfoot further agreed with the
Duncan court's reasoning that "[t]he 'plain intent' of the divorce
decree, which granted a lien upon the entire farm, was to declare
the debtor the sole owner of the property, subject to the non-
debtor's lien. '38 9 Whatever interest the non-debtor had in the
farm was dissolved by the divorce decree, and the non-debtor's
"preexisting interest in the farm was thus 'simply irrele-
vant.' "390 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit in Sanderfoot deter-
mined that the divorce proceeding had extinguished whatever
interest Ms. Farrey had in the homestead, and that "[h]er new
interest, created in the dissolution order and evidenced by her
lien, attached to Mr. Sanderfoot's interest in the property. 3 91
Therefore, the circuit court concluded, as the Western District
of Wisconsin had, that whether Ms. Farrey "had prior rights in
the residence under Wisconsin law is . . . 'simply irrelevant.' "392
In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Posner maintained
that the statute does not state that a judicial lien is avoidable to
the extent that it impairs an exemption. 93 The statute, opined
Judge Posner, "says that the bankrupt may avoid 'the fixing of'
such lien 'on an interest of the debtor in property' [and] [t]he
debtor must have the interest at the time the court places the
lien on it."394 In the present case, Judge Posner continued, that
condition was not satisfied.39 5 The Sanderfoots had owned their
home jointly prior to the divorce. Pursuant to Wisconsin state
law, Mr. Sanderfoot could not have sold the home without Ms.
Farrey's consent, "whether or not her name appeared on the ti-
386. Id. at 602 (quoting In re Duncan, 85 B.R. 80, 82 (W.D. Wis. 1988)).
387. Id. (citing Duncan, 85 B.R. at 81).
388. Id. (citing and quoting Duncan, 85 B.R. at 82).
389. Id. (citing Duncan, 85 B.R. at 82).
390. Id. (citing and quoting Duncan, 85 B.R. at 82).
391. Id.
392. Id. (quoting Duncan, 85 B.R. at 82).
393. Id. at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting).
394. Id.
395. Id.
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tie papers.13 9 Accordingly, Mr. Sanderfoot "did not own it free
and clear of his wife's interest, which was equal to his own.
397
The divorce court, said Judge Posner, "did not extinguish her
interest, but instead transformed it from that of a co-owner to
that of a mortgagee."398
6. Farrey's Petition for Certiorari
Ms. Farrey then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. In her petition, Farrey presented
the following question for review: "Does the federal bankruptcy
code give an individual awarded his spouse's interest in the fam-
ily's exempt homestead in a contested divorce case, the absolute
right to avoid the homestead lien simultaneously awarded the
debtor's spouse in the same divorce judgement?" 3"
Farrey made two arguments in support of her petition.
First, she argued, the Seventh Circuit's decision to allow an ex-
spouse to avoid a homestead lien "awarded to the other spouse
in a divorce decree" was at odds with decisions in two other cir-
cuits.400 Farrey conceded that although the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits had found judicial liens to be avoidable,40 ' the Eighth
and Tenth Circuits had found that they were not.402 Farrey as-
serted that in 1978 Congress "specifically preserved a concept
that has been integral to the law of bankruptcy for at least 100
years: '[t]he setting apart of the homestead to the bankrupt
[debtor] . . . did not relieve the property from the operation of
liens created by contract before the bankruptcy.' "403
The court of appeals, said Farrey, "misapplied the language
of the Bankruptcy Code in § 522(f)."104 "Under Wisconsin's
396. Id. (citation omitted).
397. Id.
398. Id. (citing Wozniak v. Wozniak, 359 N.W.2d 147 (Wis. 1984)).
399. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1990) (No. 90-350), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (hereinafter Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari).
400. Id. at 9.
401. Id. at 9 & n.3 (citing In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989)).
402. Id. (citing In re Borman, 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Donahue, 862
F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984)).
403. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 354, at 12-13 (quoting Long v. Bullard, 117
U.S. 617, 621 (1886) (alterations in original))..
404. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 399, at 20-21.
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marital property law ...each party had a 'present undivided
one-half interest in each item of marital property.' "405 "After
their divorce, only Mr. Sanderfoot owned the home and the
land, encumbered by a lien imposed simultaneously with the
transfer of title by the state court to compensate Ms. Farrey for
her property interests in the marriage."' ' Had the lien on his
title been "awarded either one day before the divorce on Mr.
Sanderfoot's undivided half interest or one day after the divorce
... the lien might be subject to the avoidance statute.' ' 0 7 Farrey
argued that "three critical events - divorce, the transfer of Ms.
Farrey's entire interest to Mr. Sanderfoot, and the court's impo-
sition of the lien to compensate Ms. Farrey - occurred simul-
taneously in the same bench decision and in the same divorce
judgment."' 0 8 The Seventh Circuit, Farrey contended, "misread
the statute when it focused on the 'fixing of a [judiciall lien'
without regard for the complementary phrase 'on an interest of
the debtor.' ",09 The lien, argued Farrey, "came with the prop-
erty interest he received in the divorce judgment, and a debtor
can never avoid a lien on an interest the debtor acquired subject
to the lien."'11 Second, Farrey advanced her plea for certiorari
by discussing the significant impact that the inconsistent appli-
cation of the bankruptcy law has on state and federal courts and
innumerable litigants.'
7. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split of
authority among the circuits. 2 Justice White wrote the Court's
opinion.'1 3 He articulated the question presented for review as
whether § 522(f)(1):
405. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 354, at 19 (citation omitted).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 20-21.
411. Id. at 36.
412. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1828 (1990) (citation omitted).
413. Id. at 1826. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter joined in all but the penultimate paragraph of Part III.
Id. at 1826-27. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Souter
joined. Id. at 1831.
1993]
55
PACE LAW REVIEW
permits a debtor to avoid the fixing of a lien on a homestead,
where the lien is granted to the debtor's former spouse under a
divorce decree that extinguishes all previous interests the parties
had in the property, and in no event secures more than the value
of the non-debtor spouse's former interest. 14
The Court went on to identify the phrase, "'the debtor may
avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest in ... property,' "11 as
being "[t]he key portion of § 522(f) .... "11 The Court agreed
with Judge Posner's and Farrey's construction of "the text as
permitting the avoidance of a lien only where the lien attached
to the debtor's interest at some point after the debtor obtained
the interest.14 17
The Court, in discussing the concept that certain valid liens
which are obtained before bankruptcy can be enforced on ex-
empt property,418 noted that this principal was generally pre-
served by Congress in the 1978 Code. '19 However, the Court
pointed out that in the 1978 Code, "Congress also revised the
law to avoid the fixing of some liens. '4 20 Section 522 (f)(1), the
Court continued, "extends this protection to cases involving the
fixing of judicial liens onto exempt property." 2 The House Re-
port, the Court added, provided "specific legislative history...
[and] suggests that a principal reason Congress singled out judi-
cial liens was because they are a device commonly used by credi-
tors to defeat the protection bankruptcy law accords exempt
property against debts. 4 22 To underscore its conclusion, the
Court quoted from the House Report as follows: "the first right
[§ 522(f)(1)] allows the debtor [is] to undo the actions of credi-
tors that bring legal action against the debtor shortly before
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy exists to provide relief for an
overburdened debtor. If a creditor beats the debtor into court,
the debtor is nevertheless entitled to his exemptions. '423
414. Id. at 1827.
415. Id. at 1828 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988)).
416. Id. (construing 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988)).
417. Id. at 1828-29.
418. Id. at 1829.
419. Id.
420. Id. (citing 111 U.S.C. § 545).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. (quoting HR. REP. No., supra note 71, at 595, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at
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The Court then turned to the question of whether
Sanderfoot had "ever possessed an interest to which the lien
fixed, before it fixed . "424 That determination, wrote the
Court, is a matter of state law. The Court continued, Farrey
"contends that prior to the divorce judgment, she and her hus-
band held title to the real estate in joint tenancy, each possess-
ing an undivided one-half interest. '42 '5 Farrey further asserted
that the divorce decree simultaneously "extinguished these in-
terests . . . and ... created new interests in place of the old ....
Both in his briefs and at oral argument, Sanderfoot agreed on
each point.' '4 2 6 Under the view of both parties, wrote the Court,
and assuming that they "characterize[d] Wisconsin law cor-
rectly,... Sanderfoot took the interest and the lien together, as
if he had purchased an already encumbered estate from a third
party."427 Accordingly, the Court stated, "[s]ince Sanderfoot
never possessed his new fee simple interest before the lien
'fixed,' § 522(f)(1) is not available to void the lien. '428
8. Post-Sanderfoot
In In re Montgomery,429 the federal bankruptcy court ad-
dressed the same issue as that in Sanderfoot.430 Under the de-
cree in Montgomery, the debtor retained the marital home and
agreed to pay the non-debtor spouse's share of the equity in the
6087-88).
424. Id. at 1830.
425. Id.
426. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 7-8; Transcript of Oral Argument at 39)
(emphasis added)).
427. Id. at 1830-31.
428. Id. at 1831. The Court also observed that even if, under Wisconsin law, the
divorce decree had simply "reordered" the Sanderfoots' pre-existing interests, rather
than extinguishing those pre-existing interests, the same result would follow. Id. In that
case, in the Court's view, Sanderfoot would have retained his pre-existing interest, "aug-
mented by Farrey's prior interest." Id. And, the Court continued, since the state court
had protected Farrey's interest with a lien, Sanderfoot would still be barred from avoid-
ing the lien "since it [would have] fastened only to what had been Farrey's pre-existing
interest, and this interest Sanderfoot would never have possessed without the lien having
already fixed." Id.
429. In re Montgomery, 128 B.R. 780 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).
430. Id. at 781. The Montgomery court also addressed the issue of whether an obli-
gation under a hold harmless agreement contained in the marital settlement and separa-
tion decree was in the nature of a property settlement and, as such, dischargeable. Id.
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house to the non-debtor spouse by a given date.431 The court
said the issue with respect to the claim for the non-debtor
spouse's share of the equity was whether it was a post-petition
obligation or a maintenance award, both of which are non-dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy, or a property settlement obligation,
which is dischargeable in bankruptcy.432 "Finally," the court
asked, "if such obligation is not a post-petition obligation, and is
not maintenance, can the Court impose an equitable lien on the
debtor's homestead by virtue of a judgment having been entered
in favor of the [non-debtor spouse] prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition?""3 The court opined that, "[d]espite the
number of questions raised in the first issue, it [was] essentially
resolved by Farrey v. Sanderfoot ...and Bush v. Taylor ...
.143' In the instant case, as in Sanderfoot, the court continued,
the non-debtor spouse was given a money award "as a property
settlement for her half of the equity on the house, and judgment
was entered on this amount ....,8 Since this judgment repre-
sents a lien on the debtor's real estate, the court said, "the
Sanderfoot decision requires a finding that does not permit an
avoidance of the lien. 436
In In re Finch,3 7 a Texas case, a divorce decree awarded
the debtor community real estate holdings and granted the non-
debtor spouse a lien against the land to secure the judgment.438
The debtor subsequently filed for bankruptcy and moved to
avoid the wife's lien, claiming that it was avoidable as a judicial
lien which impaired his Texas homestead exemption on the
property. 439 The bankruptcy court denied the husband's motion
and the district court affirmed, stating that "[tihe cornerstone
issue on appeal [was] whether [the debtor] could seek avoidance
of the judicial lien as a matter of law."" The court cited the
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 781-82.
434. Id. at 782 (citations omitted).
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. 130 B.R. 753 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
438. Id. at 755.
439. Id.
440. Id.
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Supreme Court's decision in Sanderfoot"1 as controlling.'42 In
Sanderfoot, the court said, the Supreme Court held that under
11 U.S.C. § 522(f) a debtor cannot avoid "a judicial lien that
attached to property at the same time that the debtor acquired
his present interest in that property.""4
3
The Finch court went on to say that the Supreme Court
had applied this rule "in finding that a debtor in bankruptcy
could not avoid a judicial lien awarded by a state court in a di-
vorce decree to equalize the division of formerly community
property.""' The debtor argued that Texas law calls for a differ-
ent result than that arrived at in Sanderfoot, which had applied
Wisconsin law." 5 The Finch court agreed that the Supreme
Court had "premised its [Sanderfoot] decision on the parties'
undisputed contention that under Wisconsin law, a divorce de-
cree creates new interests in place of the old in favor of the ex-
spouses.' 4  However, the Finch court nonetheless found that
"Texas law treats pre- and post-divorce interests in community
property" in a similar fashion to that detailed in Sanderfoot.44 7
Under Wisconsin law, as applicable in Sanderfoot, "the divorce
decree transformed the ex-spouses' one-half community inter-
ests in the property into a fee simple interest."448 Accordingly,
the Finch court said, "[t]he lien awarded to the non-acquiring
spouse in a divorce decree" attached "to the acquiring spouse's
'new' fee simple interest. '449 Under Texas law, in "divorce pro-
ceedings, all community property becomes part of an estate,
which the trial court must divide."'4 0 Since the debtor's "one-
half community interest as such did not survive the entry of the
divorce decree he did not hold any preexisting interest at the
time of the decree's entry to which the equitable lien could have
441. 111 S. Ct. 1825.
442. Finch, 130 B.R. at 755.
443. Id.
444. Id. (citing Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. at 1829).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 756.
448. Id. at 755.
449. Id. at 755-56.
450. Id. at 756 (citing Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. 1982); Hailey
v. Hailey, 331 S.W.2d 299, 302-03 (1960)).
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attached." ' 1 Instead, the court continued, the lien attached at
the same time that the debtor acquired the fee simple interest in
the property, precisely as contemplated in Sanderfoot.52
In In re Fischer,'45 "[tihe Final Judgment of Dissolution of
Marriage provided that the Debtor was to receive the former
marital home"454 in return for which "[the non-debtor spouse]
was to execute a quit claim deed to the home. 45 5 The court
awarded a lien on the former marital property to the non-debtor
spouse because the non-debtor spouse had advanced money to
prevent foreclosure on the property immediately before the en-
try of the Final Judgement of Dissolution of Marriage. The issue
was whether the non-debtor's lien was "a type of judicial lien
which can be avoided pursuant to § 522(f)(1)."'"5 The court first
noted that, since the non-debtor spouse's lien was obtained by
judicial order, it might initially appear to be a judicial lien.' 57
However, "a closer examination leads to the conclusion that [the
non-debtor spouse] has merely an equitable lien which was rec-
ognized and imposed by the Final Judgment which dissolved the
marriage of the parties. '458 In other words, the court said, the
marriage judgment "did not impose [the non-debtor spouse's]
lien on the former marital home; rather, it simply recognized the
non-debtor spouse's equitable lien which already existed."' 59
The Fischer court reasoned that this analysis squared with the
Supreme Court's comment in Sanderfoot to the effect that "the
legislative history of § 522(f)(1) suggests that it was intended to
thwart creditors who sensed an impending bankruptcy and
rushed to Court to get a judgment with which they could defeat
the debtor's exemptions.' 60
451. Id. at 757.
452. Id.
453. 129 B.R. 285 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
454. Id. at 286.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. (emphasis added).
459. Id. at 287 (citing In re Boyd, 31 B.R. 591 (D. Minn. 1983)). The Fischer court
construed Boyd as follows: "lien not necessarily judicial lien as contemplated by
§ 522(f)(1) merely because it was imposed in judicial proceeding." Id.
460. Id. at 286.
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In Klemme v. Schoneman,6 1 the non-debtor spouse insti-
tuted suit against the debtor to foreclose on a lien which the
non-debtor spouse had obtained on jointly owned property pur-
suant to a divorce judgement. The Court of Appeals of Wiscon-
sin affirmed the court below and held that the debtor could not
avoid the lien by claiming a post-divorce discharge in bank-
ruptcy because, the court said, the lien was a mortgage lien.4 62
Moreover, the court opined, it is the purpose of a lien, which
exists as the result of a divorce judgment, which "must ulti-
mately control. '463 The Klemme debtor invoked the Supreme
Court's decision in Sanderfoot to support [his] argument that
[the non-debtor spouse's] lien was avoidable.464 The Wisconsin
court disagreed, noting that in Sanderfoot the Supreme Court
had observed "that whether a debtor 'possessed an interest to
which the lien fixed, before it fixed, is a question of state
law.' "9465
The Wisconsin court then reasoned that it would not be
necessary to "answer the question left open under Sanderfoot"
unless the lien in question was a judicial lien.6 6 If, as the wife
argued, it was a mortgage lien instead, Sanderfoot would be-
come irrelevant to this case. 467 To make this determination, the
Klemme court applied Wozniak v. Wozniak's 46 8 mortgage test to
the Klemme facts.4 9 The court concluded that the non-debtor
461. 477 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
462. Id. at 80.
463. Id. at 81.
464. Id. at 79.
465. Id. (quoting Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. at 1830). However, the Klemme court con-
tinued, the Sanderfoot Court:
was not required to delve into Wisconsin law on this point since Sanderfoot had
conceded that the effect of the Wisconsin divorce judgment was to extinguish the
parties' prior interests in the property and to create a new interest in Sanderfoot's
favor. From this concession the Supreme Court concluded that 'Sanderfoot must
lose' because Farrey's judicial lien encumbered Sanderfoot's "wholly new fee sim-
ple interest" and, thus, Sanderfoot could not avoid the lien under sec. 522(f)(1).
Id.
466. Id. at 80.
467. Id.
468. 359 N.W.2d 147 (Wis. 1984).
469. The Wozniak court articulated the characteristics of a mortgage lien as follows:
One such characteristic, according to the supreme court, is that a mortgage serves
as security for a particular piece of property, while a judgment lien ordinarily is
not a lien on any specific real estate of the judgment debtor but is a general lien
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spouse's interest was a mortgage lien because, even though the
term "mortgage" was not used in the divorce judgment, the non-
debtor was awarded a lien on a specific parcel of real estate as
security for the payment of a sum of money, bearing interest at
a specific rate, and due on a specific date. The Klemme court
went on to state that "[s]ince the [Wozniak] trial court contem-
plated the enforcement of [the non-debtor's] secured interest by
means of a foreclosure action, the [Wisconsin] supreme court
concluded that this represented 'persuasive evidence that the
trial court awarded a mortgage interest in the property.' "470 The
Klemme court stated that it did not deem "the absence of ex-
press 'foreclosure' language as fatal to [the non-debtor's] mort-
gage lien claim under Wozniak,' '471 and pointed out that the lien
expressed in the divorce judgment contained "all the 'mortgage'
ingredients present in Wozniak: (1) [non-debtor's] interest ...
expressed as a lien; (2) the lien attaches to a particular piece of
property; (3) the lien is to guarantee payment of a sum of
money; (4) the debt earns interest; and (5) the debt is due on a
particular date. 47
2
The court countered the debtor's argument that its inter-
pretation of Wozniak was tantamount to declaring "every di-
vorce judgment lien a mortgage lien.' 473 The debtor's reading of
Wozniak, said the court, "is at once too broad and too nar-
row."'474 The determination of whether a lien granted in a di-
vorce decree is a judicial or mortgage lien, said the court, "will
continue to require a case-by-case analysis"'475 and "[w]hile it
may in most cases result in a declaration of a mortgage lien,
on all of the debtor's real property. The court also observed that a transfer of
property as security, regardless of the form thereof, denotes a mortgage.
Klemme, 477 N.W.2d at 80 (citing Wozniak, 359 N.W.2d at 149-50).
470. Id. (citing Wozniak, 359 N.W.2d at 149-50).
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 81.
474. Id. Moreover, the court asserted:
The central teaching of Wozniak is that a lien granted in the context of a judg-
ment of divorce will be deemed a mortgage by operation of law, where the particu-
lar facts of the case indicate that the court intended that the lien attach to a
specific parcel of real estate for the purpose of securing a debt whose satisfaction
represents a division of the marital estate.
Id. (citing Wozniak, 359 N.W.2d at 150).
475. Id.
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neither Wozniak nor this case create an ironclad rule.' '476 The
court added:
[a]lthough Sanderfoot represents a statement of the United
States Supreme Court and springs from a Wisconsin divorce,
neither the parties nor the Supreme Court factored Wozniak into
their discussions. In this case, Wozniak requires that we construe
[the non-debtor's] lien as a mortgage lien, not a judicial lien.
Sanderfoot, as a judicial lien case, thus does not control. The
questions left open by Sanderfoot must await another day.477
The court concluded "by echoing the [Wisconsin] supreme
court's caution in Wozniak: 'To avoid the problem created by
the judgment in this case, trial courts should specify in the judg-
ment of divorce the type of lien awarded.' "T478 The court ex-
tended the "same caution to counsel who draft such
judgments.' '479
E. Fairness Concerns
Many of the courts included some thoughts about fairness
in their opinions. Among the cases surveyed, with the exception
of those courts which followed the present circumstances test,4 0
no court opined that, despite its legal conclusions, it would be
fair for the debtor to retain property, in any form, that had been
awarded to the non-debtor pursuant to a divorce decree.
Even some of the courts that held that a debtor was dis-
charged from a financial obligation to an ex-spouse were obvi-
ously motivated to voice their beliefs with respect to fairness
and justice. For example, the Maus court wrote, "we recognize
that our decision may produce questionable results in some cir-
cumstances."'" The court in In re Boggess8 2 interjected in its
476. Id.
477. Id. (emphasis added).
478. Id. (quoting Wozniak, 359 N.W.2d at 150).
479. Id.
480. The courts that followed the present circumstances test as expressed in In re
Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983) believed that in some instances if, from the time
of the award, the financial circumstances of the non-debtor had improved, or the finan-
cial circumstances of the debtor had deteriorated, then fairness would dictate that even
obligations for support should be eliminated or reduced. See supra notes 190-97 and
accompanying text.
481. 837 F.2d 935, 939-40 (10th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 275-82 and accompany-
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opinion: "[R]egardless of its own perceptions of fairness, [this]
Court must give effect to the policy decisions embodied in the
express language of code provisions."' 8 3 Judge Ripple, writing
for the Seventh Circuit in Sanderfoot,484 stated:
We recognize the policy arguments against avoidance, but empha-
size that it is not for the courts to make policy .... While we
might have struck a different balance than did Congress, we are
not free to disregard the clear legislative judgment that debtors
may avoid judicial liens of the type at issue.486
In Bush v. Taylor,488 the court was prompted to write:
Whenever a debt arising from the division of marital property is
discharged, the non-debtor spouse is thereby deprived of his or
her sole and separate property .... As far as the Code is con-
cerned, [the non-debtor spouse's] loss is not materially different
from that of any creditor who may have extended goods, services,
or funds to the debtor before bankruptcy, and subsequently is
barred from collected the resulting just debt. There are sound
policy arguments for treating property-settlement debts to for-
mer spouses differently, but the drafters of the Code declined to
do so.4 8 7
Judge Bowman, dissenting in Bush, wrote, "Short of out-
right thievery, it is hard to imagine a more compelling case of
unjust enrichment. 88 Judge Bowman continued, "If I truly
thought that Congress had commanded such a bizarre and un-
just result, I would join the Court's opinion. '"89 The Bankruptcy
Code, he said, "is not intended to provide a way for a tricky
ing text.
482. 105 B.R. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989).
483. Boggess, 105 B.R. at 475.
484. In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990).
485. Id. at 605.
486. 893 F.2d 962, rev'd 912 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding debtor was entitled to
a discharge of obligation to share a portion of debtor's pension with ex-spouse). The
Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and held that pension payments are not dis-
chargeable either because they represented a constructive trust or, alternatively, were
post-petition debts. Bush, 912 F.2d at 993. See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying
text.
487. Bush, 893 F.2d at 966 (emphasis added).
488. Id. at 967 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
489. Id.
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debtor to obtain clear title to the property of another. '490
Equally plainspoken and scathing was Judge Posner's dissent to
the Seventh's Circuit's decision in Sanderfoot.491 Judge Posner
wrote, "He seeks a fresh start with someone else's property. '" 492
Posner also said, "Today we place the crown of success on this
vicious scheme[,]" 493 and he asserted, "when a debtor uses the
Code to steal from his former wife, we should not lightly con-
clude that the Code, properly read, commands such a result."4 94
Judge Posner also pointed out that Sanderfoot's lawyer had
conceded that Sanderfoot's successful attempt to avoid Farrey's
lien had undermined the objective of the divorce decree, but also
contended that result to be of no consequence due to the inequi-
tibility of bankruptcy. 95 In Judge Posner's words:
I am at a loss to understand why we should strain the language
and ignore the purpose of the lien-avoidance statute in order to
achieve a result that ... denies simple justice .... I do not expect
an argument about the characterization of our result, because at
oral argument the husband's lawyer admitted that his client's
action had subverted the purpose of the divorce decree. The law-
yer added, however, that this did not matter because, (in his
words) "bankruptcy is inequitable." I had thought bankruptcy a
branch rather than a rejection of equity.496
In his concurring opinion to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Sanderfoot, Justice Kennedy, joined by Jus-
tice Souter, agreed with the "Court's determination that respon-
dent conceded what we all now know to be the key point in the
case." '497 In his brief before the Court, wrote Justice Kennedy,
"[i]n describing the effect of the Wisconsin Family Court's de-
cree on the real property in question," 981 the husband stated:
Prior to the judgment of divorce, the parties held title to the real
estate in joint tenancy, each holding a pre-existing undivided one-
490. Id.
491. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990).
492. Id. at 608 (Posner, J., dissenting).
493. Id. at 606.
494. Id. at 607.
495. Id.
496. Id. (emphasis added)
497. 111 S. Ct. at 1831 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
498. Id.
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half interest. At the point that the divorce court issued its prop-
erty division determination, those property rights were wholly ex-
tinguished and new rights were put into place. 99
That concession, said Kennedy, was "fatal to the argument
[Sanderfoot] must make to prevail here, which is that the judi-
cial lien fixed upon his pre-existing interest in the property." 50
Having determined that this is the standard by which the issue
is to be decided, Kennedy cautioned:
the possibility arises that later cases, whether from Wisconsin or
from some other jurisdiction, could yield a different result. This
would depend upon the relevant state laws defining the estate
owned by a spouse who had a pre-existing interest in marital
property and upon state laws governing awards of property under
a decree settling marital rights.50 1
The applicable Wisconsin law, continued Justice Kennedy,
"enacted when the State adopted substantial parts of the Uni-
form Marital Property Act, provides that '[a]ll property of
spouses is presumed to be marital property,' and '[e]ach spouse
has a present undivided one-half interest in each item of marital
property.' "502 Accordingly, wrote Justice Kennedy:
[a]bsent respondent's concession, it would seem that the state
court did not divest him of his pre-existing interest. At no place
in its "Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of Di-
vorce" did the court declare that respondent's predecree interests
were extinguished. Rather, the decree declared that upon its ef-
fective date sole title to the property vested in respondent. '53
In line with this analysis, Kennedy expressed concern that
the Bankruptcy Code might be used in some later case to allow a
spouse to avoid an otherwise valid obligation under a divorce
court decree.504 Although "adept drafting of property decrees or
the use of court orders directing conveyances in a certain se-
quence might resolve the problem,"' 0 5 he wrote, "it appears that
499. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 7-8).
500. Id. at 1831-32
501. Id. at 1832.
502. Id. (citing Wis. STAT. § 766.31(2) (1989-90)).
503. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
504. Id.
505. Id. at 1832-33.
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congressional action may be necessary to avoid in some future
case the perhaps unjust result the Court today avoids having to
consider only because of the fortuity of a litigant's
concession. '" 56
Courts that have held that the debtor cannot discharge his
debt to the non-debtor spouse have expressed their satisfaction
at having been able to arrive at a fair and just result.50 7 More-
over, in some of these cases, the dissenters, while unhappy with
the reasoning of the majorities, were also satisfied with the fair-
ness of the outcomes. The court in In re Hart50 8 provided an
example when it wrote: "The Defendant now seeks to have the
advantage of the agreement but to avoid its onerous results. A
compelling and explicit statutory requirement to the contrary
would be required to negative the parties' agreement and permit
such an unfair result."50 9 In addition, the court in In re Con-
way510 wrote: "[T]he debtor, having received the benefit in the
form of the homestead conferred upon him by the divorce court,
cannot now disaffirm the detriment as embodied in the lien....
To do so would be tantamount to giving the debtor a wind-
fall. 5 11 Similarly, the court in In re Thomas" 2 stated:
This result is not only supported by the legal considerations
noted above, but also by compelling equitable considerations. To
rule otherwise . . . [iun effect ... would allow the debtor to keep
property or its proceeds which belongs to another person.5 13
Justice Kennedy, concurring in Sanderfoot,51' asserted, "The re-
sult the Court reaches consists with fairness and common
sense."
515
506. Id. at 1833.
507. See infra notes 508-18 and accompanying text.
508. 50 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985) (holding lien was equitable, thus not avoida-
ble, based on parties' intent to create lien on specific property of debtor).
509. Id. (quoting In re Wicks, 26 B.R. 769, 771 (Bankr. D. Minn.)).
510. 93 B.R. 731 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988) (holding lien not avoidable).
511. Id. at 734.
512. 32 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (holding lien not avoidable because -it is not a
judicial lien).
513. Id. at 12-13 (citing In re Maness, 17 B.R. 76, 77 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)) (em-
phasis added).
514. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
515. Id. at 1832 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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At least one court,516 although it acknowledged that the
award made to the non-debtor had the indicia of a property set-
tlement, nevertheless refused to allow the debtor to avoid paying
the debt. 7 The court stated flatly that "[a] discharge in bank-
ruptcy... does not give the debtor the right to withhold specific
property from its true owner." '
G. Proposed Legislation
On March 5, 1991, Representative Henry J. Hyde of Illinois
introduced the Property Settlement Integrity Act of 1991,519
House Bill 1242, whose stated purpose was "[t]o amend title 11
of the United States Code to make nondischargeable debts for
liabilities under the terms of a property settlement agreement
entered into in connection with a separation agreement or di-
vorce decree.52 0 The bill was referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary. A copy of the bill, accompanied by a "Dear Colleague
letter," was sent to each member of the House of Representa-
tives.52 1 The letter stated:
This legislation would prevent the discharge of any liability
under the terms of a property settlement agreement. It is
designed to protect spouses from having the assets upon which
they depend stripped from them and distributed to other credi-
tors . . . . The support and maintenance of the family, even
516. In re Underwood, 17 B.R. 417 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
517. Id.
518. Id. at 419 (citing Royce v. Dunlap, 15 B.R. 737 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981)).
519. H.R. 1242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
520. "Sec. 2. AMENDMENT Paragraph (5) of section 523(a) of title 11, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor
(A) for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child in
connection with -
(i) a separation agreement, divorce decree,
or other order of a court of record;
(ii) a determination made in accordance with
State or territorial law by a governmental unit; or
(iii) a property settlement agreement; or
(B) for any liability under the terms of a property settlement agreement en-
tered into in connection with a separation agreement or divorce decree; ..
Id.
521. Telephone interview with George M. Fishman, Legislative Aide to Rep. Henry
J. Hyde (October 16, 1991).
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though separated through divorce, should continue to be a princi-
ple consideration in the distribution of property.2 2
Representative Hyde first proposed this amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act in 1984,523 and has resubmitted the bill every
year since then.524
III. Analysis
A. The Courts Send a Message to Congress
In most of the cases surveyed, where a court held that a
debtor was discharged from a debt to a non-debtor spouse, there
are expressions of the court's inability to change law, because
that power rests with Congress. For example, the court in In re
Boggess52 5 asserted, that "[R]egardless of its own perceptions of
fairness, [this] Court must give effect to the policy decisions em-
bodied in the express language of code provisions."' 26 In
Sanderfoot,5  the Seventh Circuit held that Farrey's lien was
avoidable, stating, "We recognize the policy arguments against
avoidance, but emphasize that it is not for the courts to make
policy.... Perhaps Congress should reexamine the statute, but
until it is amended this court is constrained to apply the law as
plainly written." '528 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in the
United States Supreme Court's Sanderfoot decision expressed
concern that in similar cases a like result could not be reached
and that "it appears that congressional action may be necessary
to avoid in some future case the perhaps unjust result the Court
today avoids having to consider." 52 9 The Eighth Circuit in Bush
v. Taylor530 declared that "Congress has chosen not to except
property settlements from discharge, and we are not at liberty to
522. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 2 (emphasis in original).
523. Fishman, supra note 521.
524. Id.
525. 105 B.R. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989); see supra notes 482-83 and accompanying
text.
526. Boggess, 105 B.R. at 475; see supra notes 482-83 and accompanying text.
527. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990).
528. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 605; see supra notes 377-92 and accompanying text.
529. In re Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1832 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra
notes 497-506 and accompanying text.
530. 893 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1990); see supra 216-23 notes and accompanying text.
19931
69
PACE LAW REVIEW
redefine 'debt' in order to accomplish that result. '5 51 The Tenth
Circuit in Maus v. Maus5 32 stated that "the policy considera-
tions at issue ha[d] been weighed by Congress and embodied in
the language of the Bankruptcy Act. ' 513 The Maus court added,
"It is the prerogative of Congress and not of the courts to adjust
that balance" 53
4
In many cases, a court's observations about its inability to
rule in a fair way without a Congressional mandate may be of-
fered to justify its conclusions rather than to bemoan them.
However, this Comment maintains that the courts' assertions re-
garding Congressional mandates in the context of the bank-
ruptcy/divorce cases are genuine outcries for legislation, not
merely offers of justification. These assertions, when read with
the vehement commentary of many of the courts regarding not
only the injustice, but indeed the criminality, of allowing a
debtor to retain property that belongs to his former spouse,535
present powerful evidence that the courts are urging Congress to
remedy the situation.
In general, courts at every level have struggled to find theo-
ries upon which to hold that a debtor in bankruptcy will not be
allowed to avoid paying to an ex-spouse an award granted to
that ex-spouse pursuant to a divorce decree. Some of the pen-
sion cases are illustrative: the courts held that it was not the
debtor at all who was liable, but rather the military or employer
pension fund, and, therefore, the debtor could not be discharged
of the debt .53  Another recurring rationale is exemplified by
courts that have found that the debtor was merely a "conduit"
of the non-debtor spouse's property from the employer to the
non-debtor spouse. 3
531. Bush, 893 F.2d at 966; see supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
532. 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
533. Maus, 837 F.2d at 940; see supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
534. Maus, 837 F.2d at 940.
535. See supra notes 480-518 and accompanying text. The court in Duncan "de-
cline[d] to join the herd of prior courts who have trampled the Bankruptcy Code in a
rush to achieve their own perception of justice in the divorce setting." In re Duncan, 85
B.R. 80, 83 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (emphasis added).
536. In re Manners, 62 B.R. 656, 658 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986); In re Hall, 62 B.R.
1002, 1003 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1985); In re Anderson, 121 B.R. 355, (Bankr. D. Cal. 1982).
See supra notes 212-41 and accompanying text.
537. See supra note 214.
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Additionally, in some of the lien cases the courts have ven-
tured a theory that asserts that the non-debtor spouse was
granted an implicit lien because "the testimony and the totality
of the decree itself"53 8 implied that the intent of the parties and
the state court was to create a lien to protect a pre-existing
property interest.53 9 The court in Wozniak v. Wozniak, 40 with
facts essentially identical to those in Sanderfoot, compiled a list
of factors that satisfied the court that the lien in question was a
mortgage lien and, therefore, not avoidable. The court in In re
Hart54' found that the parties' apparent intent to create a lien
on specific property of the debtor was sufficient to hold that the
non-debtor spouse's lien was an equitable lien, adding that "an
equitable lien may also be created by judicial decree. '542 The
court in In re Rittenhouse,54 3 in holding that the non-debtor
spouse's lien was unavoidable, asserted that it had looked to
Tenth Circuit decisions for binding precedent. The Rittenhouse
court then listed the three "survival theories ' 54 4 for liens and
inferred from the Tenth Circuit's decisions that it had not "fore-
closed the availability of any of the three theories, ' 545 notwith-
standing the Tenth Circuit's having termed Boyd's pre-existing
interest theory a "convoluted theory".5 46 The Rittenhouse court
went on with equanimity to hold that the lien could not be
avoided because "[tihe interest transferred to the debtor [was]
already subject to the lien .... , To date, the lien cases that
have come after Sanderfoot548 have all been decided in favor of
the non-debtor spouse. Thus, Justice Kennedy's misgivings that
the Bankruptcy Code "may be used in some later case to allow a
538. In re Seablom, 45 B.R. 445, 451 (N.D. 1984); see supra notes 279-85 and ac-
companying text.
539. Seablom, 45 B.R. at 451.
540. 359 N.W.2d 147; see supra notes 319-26 and accompanying text.
541. 50 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); see supra notes 312-18 and accompanying
text.
542. Hart, 50 B.R. at 960; see supra notes 312-18 and accompanying text.
543. 103 B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989); see supra notes 279-89 and accompanying
text.
544. Rittenhouse, 103 B.R. at 251; see supra note 302 and accompanying text.
545. Rittenhouse, 103 B.R. at 254; see supra note 306 and accompanying text.
546. Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 275-82 and
accompanying text.
547. Rittenhouse, 103 B.R. at 254; see supra notes 299-309 and accompanying text.
548. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
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spouse to avoid otherwise valid obligations under a divorce court
decree, 5 49 have not yet been realized.
Strikingly, even in Klemme v. Schoneman,550 the bank-
ruptcy court did not concern itself with the debtor's failure to
concede that both parties had held title to the real estate in
joint tenancy and that the divorce decree had simultaneously ex-
tinguished those interests and created new interests - an in-
terest in the property on the part of the debtor, and a lien on
the non-debtor spouse's pre-existing interest on the part of the
non-debtor. The court reasoned that if the lien in question were
a mortgage lien, then "the question left open" by Sanderfoot
would become irrelevant to this case. 5 ' Then the court applied
the test for a mortgage that the Wozniak 5 2 court had articu-
lated. The Klemme court held that since the lien in question
was an "(1) . . . interest . . . expressed as a lien; (2) the lien
attach[ed] to a particular piece of property; (3) the lien [was] to
guarantee payment of a sum of money; (4) the debt [was to
earn] interest; and (5) the debt [was] due on a particular
date, ' 553 the test was satisfied. Accordingly, Wozniak, not
Sanderfoot, controlled the Klemme case. 54 The Klemme court
prudently expressed that it was mindful of both the Supreme
Court's statement in Sanderfoot and the fact that Sanderfoot
also involved a Wisconsin divorce. However, opined the court,
Klemme was distinguishable from Sanderfoot because "neither
the parties nor the Supreme Court factored Wozniak into their
discussions." 55 5 To date, the decision in Klemme has not been
appealed.
If it were to be appealed, it is possible that the Seventh Cir-
cuit would find that application .of Sanderfoot56 compelled a
different result. Unlike in Sanderfoot, the Klemme debtor did
not concede that both his and the non-debtor spouse's pre-ex-
549. Id. at 1832 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
550. 477 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991); see supra notes 461-79 and accompanying
text.
551. Klemme, 477 N.W.2d at 80; see supra note 466 and accompanying text.
552. Wozniak, 359 N.W.2d at 148; see supra notes 319-26 and accompanying text.
553. Klemme, 477 N.W.2d at 80; see supra note 472 and accompanying text.
554. Klemme, 477 N.W.2d at 80; see supra note 477 and accompanying text.
555. Klemme, 477 N.W.2d at 81.
556. In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 13:643
72http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/12
BANKRUPTCY AND DIVORCE
isting property interests were extinguished and simultaneously
replaced by a property interest on the part of the debtor and a
lien on the part of the non-debtor spouse.5 The Seventh Cir-
cuit might reach a different result on the state law issue of
whether the lien was a mortgage lien or a judicial lien.
A balance has not always been struck between the needs of
the debtor for a fresh start in bankruptcy and the needs of the
family for continued support, even when the family is dissolved.
Individual debtors have gained eligibility for relief when their
financial obligations become insurmountable.558 Furthermore,
they are entitled to apply for this relief on a voluntary basis.559
Married women have gained the right to own property that they
either bring with them into a marriage or earn or otherwise ac-
quire during a marriage."" The NCCUSL, state legislatures, and
the feminist movement have all attempted to mitigate the nega-
tive emotional and financial consequences of divorce by largely
abolishing a system on which both grounds and standards for
division of property were predicated on fault. 61 For the most
part, this system has been replaced by the concept of marriage
as an economic partnership.62 Although the efforts behind these
changes were well-intentioned,563 the shift from awarding women
continuing support for themselves and their children in divorce
to awarding them a larger share of the marital property has had
devastating consequences for many women whose former hus-
bands have declared bankruptcy and succeeded in being dis-
charged from remitting to their former wives their share of the
marital property.564
B. Analysis of Proposed Legislation
Section 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the
predecessor of § 523(a)(5) of the present Bankruptcy Code. 65
557. See supra notes 424-27.
558. 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988).
559. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a), (b) (1988).
560. See discussion supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
561. See discussion supra notes 108-61 and accompanying text.
562. See discussion supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
563. WEITZMAN, supra note 103, at 16-20.
564. See supra notes 184-342 and accompanying text.
565. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523 (superseding The Bankruptcy Act of
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Section 17(a)(7) was intended to protect women at a time when
husbands were legally obligated to support their wives, and at a
time when this obligation continued even after the termination
of the marriage.5 6 At that time, for the most part, property was
awarded to the wife only if alimony was insufficient to meet her
needs for ongoing support.56 7 Section 17(a)(7) was designed to
ensure that a woman whose former husband became a debtor in
bankruptcy would not lose her (usually only) means of sup-
port.568 Today, the duty to support during marriage as well as
the duty to support upon the dissolution of a marriage are mu-
tual obligations of both spouses. 69 More importantly, today,
most state statutes direct that alimony be awarded only in in-
stances where property division is not sufficient to provide for a
spouse's needs for ongoing support. Accordingly, § 523(a)(5), the
successor of § 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, no longer amelio-
rates the problem it was designed to address.
The reasons for which Congress has not adopted the Prop-
erty Settlement Integrity Act of 1991571 are not clear.s71 Never-
theless, enactment of House Bill 124272 would be a critical step
toward effectuating a balance between the rights of the "honest,
distressed debtor, ' 5 3 and the rights of women and families in
divorce and, not inconsequently, countless lawsuits would be
1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 35)).
566. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
567. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
568. See Scheible, supra note 23, at 542-96.
569. See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
570. See supra notes 519-20 and accompanying text.
571. According to one matrimonial lawyer, each time the bill is scheduled to be
heard by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, the Committee's
attention is diverted by matters of more imminent importance, such as the stock market
crash in 1987 and Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Telephone interview with Owen Doss,
Esq., past President of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (Oct. 16, 1991).
Robert Arenstein, the current President of the American Academy of Matrimonial Law-
yers, stated that he believes H.R. 1242 is too all-encompassing, and that Congress will
only be willing to ratify a compromise measure. Mr. Arenstein further asserted that an-
other obstacle to Congressional action is that the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives regards the Supreme Court decision in Sanderfoot as having established
a rule that both marital property and support awards are no longer subject to avoidance
under the Bankruptcy Code. Telephone interview with Robert Arenstein, Esq., President
of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (Oct. 16, 1991).
572. See supra note 519 and accompanying text.
573. See supra notes 42-67 and accompanying text.
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avoided. The expense of lawsuits for women who stand to lose
their portions of marital assets would be avoided. Continued and
sometimes heightened hostilities between divorcing spouses, a
phenomenon that the introduction and establishment of non-
fault based divorce sought to alleviate, are doubtless reinforced
rather than alleviated by the availability under the Bankruptcy
Code of an avenue by which the debtor can circumvent the
terms of a settlement agreement that are disadvantageous to
him. The problematical need for a federal bankruptcy court to
interpret the intentions of a state court and/or the parties in-
volved with respect to whether a given award is in the nature of
property or in the nature of support would no longer exist. Like-
wise, the need for a federal bankruptcy court to evaluate the
needs of family members in order to determine if a support
award should be modified, an area traditionally within the
states' exclusive domain,57 4 would no longer exist. In this sense,
there is the possibility that in some isolated cases a woman
might have received support in lieu of a property settlement.
Her former husband might have misused the property in one
way or another, and then had an opportunity to prove and, in
some cases prevail in his proof, that his commitment to provide
support should be reduced or eliminated because his present cir-
cumstances rendered him unable to meet that commitment.
The enactment of various statutes guaranteeing payment of
pensions to non-debtor spouses, among which are the amend-
ment to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") 57" and the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Pro-
tection Act ("USFSPA"),578 is a powerful indication that Con-
gress is troubled by the incidence of cases whereby debtors have
been permitted, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, to retain
"the sole property" of their ex-spouses. In McCarty v. Mc-
Carty,57 the Supreme Court made note of several statutes
designed to protect non-debtor spouses' pension rights in order
to underscore its conclusion that, had Congress wished to pro-
574. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). See supra notes 224-36 and ac-
companying text.
575. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988). See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
576. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988). See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
577. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). See supra notes 224-36 and accompanying text.
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tect the interests of the former spouse of military personnel in
the latter's pensions, then Congress would have passed a similar
act to that effect.578 Less than a year later, Congress passed the
USFSPA.579 Such a chain of events leads logically to an infer-
ence: if Congress hears the courts' message, it will provide re-
course to the non-debtor ex-spouse in a bankruptcy and divorce
dispute.
IV. Conclusion
The humanitarian objective of giving a debtor a fresh start,
an equitable and orderly way to avail himself of a new begin-
ning, is certainly representative of the ideology upon which the
United States is founded. Laws designed to help women gain fi-
nancial independence and, in particular, those laws designed to
help divorcing women gain their own "fresh start" by shifting
from continued financial support awards in divorce to property
settlements in divorce, are also premised on humanitarian con-
cerns - for both women and all family members. However, this
change in women's divorce awards can have unanticipated con-
sequences when the former husband declares bankruptcy.
Historically, our bankruptcy laws have not discharged the
debtor from obligations for alimony, maintenance or support,
but have discharged the debtor from obligations which arose
from liens filed on their property before they filed for bank-
ruptcy. The latter accommodation was created to protect the
debtor from creditors who, sensing an impending bankruptcy,
rush to obtain financial commitments from the prospective
debtor. With the shift in women's divorce awards from support
to property settlements, debtors are often able to use this pro-
tection, which was directed at shielding them from commercial
creditors, to profit from awards made to them pursuant to di-
vorce decrees while simultaneously being excused from honoring
the financial obligation that was required of them pursuant to
the same divorce decree.
The enactment of House Bill 1242, a simple amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code providing that property settlements to ex-
578. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 231. See supra notes 224-36 and accompanying text.
579. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
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spouses are not dischargeable, would afford a critical remedy in
this regard. Such an amendment would offset a little known but
troubling ramification of the trend toward elimination of sup-
port awards for divorcing women.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Farrey v.
Sanderfoot580 has not resolved this problem. Indeed, Sanderfoot
did not even conclusively settle the issue for all cases where a
non-debtor spouse has a lien on marital property awarded to the
debtor pursuant to a divorce decree. The courts continue to
struggle to adhere to the strictures of the bankruptcy statutes
and, at the same time, arrive at fair results.
Ottilie Bello
580. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
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